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ABSTRACT
Exploring Barriers To Effective Risk Management Through A Proposed Risk Governance
Framework
BY

Edward Cho
November 17, 2015
Committee Chair:

Danny N. Bellenger

Major Academic Unit:

Executive Doctorate in Business

As harmful as the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was, some organizations professed some
benefits as a result; “we know our risks better,” “we can better manage risks.” Many of the
organizations that hailed such positives undoubtedly had what would generally be considered
sound risk management systems/practices (RMS). So, what happened? What prevented
organizations RMS from perhaps better mitigating risk during the recent financial crisis than was
the case? Said another way, “what are barriers to effective risk management?” This study
proposes a risk governance framework (RGF) that helps distinguish phases of RMS, and is
grounded in Risk principles versus a controls based foundation that many view as part of the
current problem with RMS. Based on our survey of 41 Risk Managers (RM) and 96 Regulators
(REG), we obtained perspectives on barriers to effective risk management including barriers to
effective risk management leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the importance of Risk
principles, and suggestions to improve the effectiveness of RMS. We also obtained RM and
REG perspectives of the impacts to RMS from our banking environment providing a type of
“insurance,” impacts to RMS due to perceptions of the state of the financial/economic
environment, how complete must phases of RMS be, compensation practices and its impacts to
RMS, and the notion of quantitative/qualitative methods in current RMS. Leading up to the
xiii

financial crisis of 2007-2009, identified barriers to effective risk management include a lack of
risk culture and under estimating risks. Some suggestions to improve RMS include improving
the risk function and developing more dynamic, forwarding looking and preemptive risk
management tools and techniques that blend quantitative and qualitative methods. The proposed
RGF and the rich context on barriers to effective risk management obtained from our study may
help practitioners and academia alike in considering ways to analyze and improve RMS.
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I

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Risk management has existed as a technical discipline in financial institutions for many
years and Regulators have assessed institutions on their ability to manage risk appropriately
(McCormally, B. C., Allen, C. L., and Mayer, H. E., 2012; Hall, M., Mikes, A., and Millo, Y.,
2013). Regulators and market participants alike have held the positives to “good management”
that the discipline of risk management practices apparently brings (Hall et al., 2013; Mikes,
2011; COSO, 2004; ISO, 2009). Although evidence that risk management prominence and
stature continues to increase in organizations as policy initiatives expand enterprise controls to
include risk management, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, and continuing risk
management failures, call for an examination of risk management practices (Bhimani, 2009; Hall
et al., 2013). With the number of years of risk managements’ existence, available
procedures/processes, and its importance to organizations, we have to question why does risk
management fail? In this paper, we seek to explore perspectives on barriers to effective risk
management.
As the financial industry has had a history of crisis, including the most recent Great
Recession, we seek to continue on those institutions subject to resolution plans (Cho, Mier, Jones
and Bellenger, 2014) to explore what are barriers to effective risk management. From a
historical perspective, Martinez-Ruiz, E., and Pons, M.A.’s (2014) paper summarizes studies of
past financial crisis. While this historical analysis of past financial crisis revealed vulnerabilities
in financial markets resulting from the globalization of financial systems and processes initiated
in 1971, the analysis relied on the historical evidence from the first globalization (1870-1913) to
draw similarities and differences (Martinez-Ruiz et al., 2014). One of the studies is Marichal’s
(2014) analysis of hearings published following what many economic historians view as the first
1

truly global financial crisis in modern capitalism called the “Great Depression of 1873-1896.”
This analysis identified that pressure from the public who were troubled by the magnitude and
effects of financial misconduct was the genesis of the resultant commissions established to
investigate the crisis. These commission reports identified that key causes of the crisis included
poor management and fraud (Martinez-Ruiz et al., 2014). Marichal’s (2014) study indicates a
period of calm in world finance until the financial crisis of 1907 that marked the beginning of a
deep depression in the United States. Some view the most important decision taken by the U.S.
Congress was to establish the National Monetary Commission (NMC). The NMC reassessed the
role of banking systems culminating in the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1913, which
shaped the regulatory and institutional banking and financial architecture in the United States
(Marichal, 2014).
Another study by Minsky (1992) suggest that financial instability does not come as a
consequence of external shocks but is rather an inherent phenomenon in the financial realm.
Minsky’s (1992) Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) challenged the classic principles that the
economy is constantly an equilibrium-seeking and sustaining system. The FIH suggests that
over periods of prolonged prosperity, capitalist economies, i.e., an economy with pricey capital
assets and a sophisticated financial system tend to move from a financial structure dominated by
stability to one of instability (Minsky, 1992). As we can see from the most recent crisis of 20072009, learning more about previous experiences does not prevent us from suffering new crises.
All major financial crises over the last two centuries have incited disbelief because of their
rapidity and the large costs that resulted (Marichal, 2014). This seems evident in the case of the
global financial crisis of 2007-2009.
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The 2007-2009 global financial and economic crisis emerged as the most significant
economic recession experienced by the United States since the Great Depression (Gökay, 2009).
The financial crisis that emerged indicated a need for change as it revealed a unique financial
system with a special ability to socialize losses while also privatizing profits (Guynn, 2012;
Andersen, L. B., Häger, D., Maberg, S., Næss, M. B., and Tungland, M., 2012). Indeed, the
economic crisis raised questions on how institution leadership, including the boards and senior
executives, were managing their institutions risks which resulted in calls to improve risk
management in financial institutions (Beasley, M. S., Branson, B. C., and Hancock, B., 2010;
Andersen et al., 2012). Many have questioned the role and profile of risk management in
financial institutions contending that challenges institutions faced were due in part to a lack of
focus on identifying, assessing and managing their existing and emerging risks. Some attribute
this inability to the existence of a risk management system or framework that was incapable of
identifying, assessing, mitigating and monitoring risks, and because institution leaders were
overconfident about their informal approaches to risk management (Aebi, V., Sabato, G., and
Schmid, M., 2012; Beasley et al., 2010; Harner, 2010).
In the wake of this Great Recession, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA), to “promote the financial stability of the United
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to
fail”, to protect the U.S. taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices, and for other purposes” (Govtrack, 2010). The DFA increased the resolution
powers of regulators and Section 165(d) established requirements of resolution plans (RPs), or
“living wills” for the more than 130 systemically important financial institutions that own more
than $50 billion in total consolidated assets (US Government Printing Office, 2012). Section 165
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also calls for risk management requirements for certain financial institutions to create
independent board-level risk committees and establish or enhance its risk management, to one
that operates on an enterprise-wide basis (Bugalla, J., Kallman, J., and Narvaez, K., 2014;
McDonald, 2004; Martin, D., and Power, M., 2007; McCormally et al., 2012;).
As suggested in Cho et al.’s (2014) recent study, the perspectives of the RPs resulting
from Section 165(d) of the DFA resulted in mixed views of their effectiveness by the experts
most closely involved with their creation and regulation, namely, employees of the affected
banks (BANs) and federal regulators (REGs) with RP oversight responsibilities. Cho et al.’s
(2014) qualitative data provides rich perspectives from BANs and REGs, including strengths of
RPs. The main strength the respondents identified was RPs created greater understanding among
BANs of their own organizations, including their complexity, dependencies, and risks.
According to one BAN, the RPs “have forced institutions to reconsider their corporate structures,
and have started them down the path to simplification.” Another BAN detailed that “they have
exposed gaps in operational processes, strategic plans, and organizational structures that have
been fixed as a result.” The responses to the study’s open ended questions fell into the primary
category of “Greater Understanding” with the coded responses being, 1) Enhanced transparency
on the operations and size of the organization; 2) Improved risk monitoring and reporting by
BANs; and 3) Improved understanding of the institution and operational risks by BANs (Cho et
al., 2014).
As important that risk management is to the banking industry, and recognizing the
aforementioned strengths as shared by the BANs and REGs indicating that RPs “enhanced
transparency to operations,” “improved risk monitoring and reporting by bankers,” and
“improved understanding of the institution and operational risks by bankers” (Cho et al, 2014),
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why did it take a massive regulation such as DFA and its requirement for RPs to illicit such
responses relative to “risk management?” Should this “improved understanding of risks” have
been byproducts of the institutions risk management practices versus a regulatory requirement in
the form of RPs? The basic views on risk management is that its risk mitigation processes
should be explicitly related to organizational and sub-organizational objectives and processes,
yet many view that despite the growing complexities of risks faced by organizations, the level of
risk management remains fairly immature (Power, 2009; Beasley et al., 2010; Hall et al., 2013;
COSO, 2004). Many question whether risk management is evolving in the right direction and
this appears questionable as extensive research in the discipline of risk management indicates as
much. Furthermore, our review of literature identified additional concerns relative to risk
management.
Current literature is varied and inconsistent on what challenges or barriers may exist to
effective risk management. A great deal of literature questions the most highly referenced of risk
management concepts, enterprise-wide risk management (ERM), questioning its ability to enable
institutions to manage risk effectively (Power, 2004; Power, 2004b; Schiller, F., and Prpich, G.,
2014; Mikes, 2009; Mikes, A., and Kaplan, R. S., 2014; Huber, C., and Scheytt, T., 2013).
Criticism includes ERMs’ lacking in its ability due to its high ambiguity and to some that it is
internal controls based and not empirically grounded (Paape, L., and Speklè, R. F., 2012; Schiller
et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2007; Power, 2009; Huber et al., 2013). Further, Schiller et al. (2014)
suggests that organizations risk management is limited due to a lack of the concept of risk and
risk knowledge generation with current ERM frameworks, noting a failure to recognize the value
of internal communication as it can result in poor integration of risk knowledge bases and risk
management systems.

5

This paper aims to make several contributions to theory and practice. First, based on
survey data from 130 institutions subject to the RP requirements of DFA, and perspectives of
certain regulatory agencies examiners and analyst and bankers with risk management
responsibilities, we explore barriers to effective risk management. As noted, the study by Cho et
al. (2014) identified that going through the process of creating RPs a benefit was improved risk
management and knowing the organization better, yet, most of these institutions subject to RP
undoubtedly had some level of risk management practices prior to DFA (McCormally et al.,
2012; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011; Harner, 2010). We seek to explore what are barriers to
effective risk management. This part of our study connects to previous work of Kleffner, A. E.,
Lee, R. B., and McGannon, B. (2003), and Beasley, M. S., Clune, R., and Hermanson, D. R.,
(2005), which calls for additional research including barriers to effective risk management. Our
study adds perspectives from those institutions risk management practices recently required to
create RPs and certain agency’s regulators, thus providing insights, and practical perspectives to
risk management professionals and academia.
Our study to understand barriers to effective risk management requires a lens with which
to explore these barriers (Arena, M., Arnaboldi, M., and Azzone, G., 2010). To this end, which
also represents our second contribution, we draw from Yaraghi, N., and Langhe, R. G., (2011)
risk management systems/practices (RMS) study, which identified critical success factors to
RMS. We adapted as three phases of RMS, “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration”
and some of the noted success factors, to explore these barriers. This connects with his call for
leveraging these factors and phases of RMS in different empirical ways relative to risk
management. Third, we refined the factors and phases of our RMS by drawing from Mikes et
al.’s (2014) study which suggests three ERM design parameters and three contingency variables
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classifying different types of risk events. The three design parameters are, (1) Processes for
identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks; (2) Frequency of risk meetings; and (3) Risk tools.
The three contingency variables classify different types of risk events as, (1) Preventable risks;
(2) Strategic execution risks; and (3) External risks. As Mikes et al. (2014) indicates that
organizations risks are contingent on context and circumstances, she offers these as ideas about
what risk management may depend on.
Lundqvist’s (2014) research explored what an ERM firm “looks like” and suggests four
pillars as integral to the implementation of an ERM as, (1) General internal environment and
objective setting; (2) General control activities and information and communication; (3) Holistic
organization of risk management; and (4) Specific risk identification and risk assessment
activities. A primary motivator of her study was the use of inconsistent indicators and measures
of ERM implementation. Given the nature of these pillars, we refined our RMS by aligning
these pillars as underlying concepts that we view as important considerations for the phases of
our RMS. Relative to Mikes et al.’s (2014) and Lundqvist’s (2014) studies and resultant
contributions, while we find these to be compelling and providing substantive detail, we thought
of these as exactly that; key “details,” which we likened to having savory sausage meat without
the casing. Hence, we adapted this detail to the RMS to provide it some model structure which
may ease the ability of practitioners to draw from as they consider this valuable detail for their
risk management efforts and practices. This connects with their calls for leveraging these design
parameters and contingency variables, and furthering analysis of the four pillars.
As noted, Schiller et al. (2014) suggests that organizations risk management is limited
due to a lack of the concept of risk and risk knowledge generation with current ERM
frameworks, noting a failure to recognize the value of internal communication as it can result in
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poor integration of risk knowledge bases and risk management systems. As such, our fourth
contribution is our proposed new “risk governance framework” (RGF). We draw from van
Asselt et al.’s (2011) risk governance study which explicates the idea that risk management is to
help risk professionals to familiarize themselves with a broader concept of risk. We view that
what may be missing from these normative ERM frameworks are underlying guidelines that can
inform thinking about how to deal with uncertain, complex and/or ambiguous risks in various
contexts. These three risk principles are, (1) Communication and Inclusion; (2) Integration; and
(3) Reflection. We connect with her efforts to synthesize risk governance and incorporate these
principles to serve as the underlying guiding risk principles of our proposed RGF. In summary,
our research on barriers to effective risk management through the lens of the proposed RGF,
which incorporates the RMS enhanced as noted above, provides a risk governance framework
with an RMS empirically grounded in success factors and corresponding phases, and risk theory
based principles serving as underlying guidance, will provide a sound lens with which to explore
perspectives on barriers to effective risk management. Tables 26, 27, 28, and 29 reflect the
critical success factor variables and three phases adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011) and
enhanced with the parameters and variables from Mikes et al. (2014). Table 30 reflects the RMS
design parameters and contingent variables adapted from Mikes et al. (2014). Table 31 reflects
the four pillars of RMS implementation adapted from Lundqvist (2014). Table 32 reflects the
three guiding risk principles adapted from van Asselt et al. (2011). Table 33 reflects the
proposed RGF which draws from Yaraghi et al. (2011), Mikes et al. (2014), Lundqvist (2014),
and van Asselt et al. (2011). See Appendix A for these Tables.
In the next sections we provide a perspective of risk and risk management, followed by a
discussion on the evolution of risk management and the rise of enterprise-wide risk management.
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This is followed by perspectives on various challenges of risk management including views on
challenges with implementing an enterprise-wide risk management framework. Sections three
and four present the methodology and discussion of our results. The final section five reflects
our conclusions, implications, limitations, and future research suggestions.

9
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

II.1 Overview of Risk and Risk Management
Risk and risk management began to receive regular exposure only from about the mid1990's onwards (Power, 2004b; Hall et al., 2013; Power, 2009; Kleffner et al., 2003; Arena et al.,
2010; Martin et al., 2007). Extensive research on risk has still not produced a widely accepted
definition of the term which should not be surprising as risk is studied in a broad range of fields,
ranging from sciences to finance and medicine to engineering and over varied disciplines and
perspectives (Doorn, 2013; Bhimani, 2009). The very concept of "risk" itself, implies the exante possibility that things can go wrong including the possibility of damage, loss or injury
whether in health, environmental or other terms (Power, 2004b; Harner, 2010; van Asselt et al.,
2011; Corbett, 2013). The ambiguity surrounding the term risk provides various actors with a
broad concept upon which they can pursue their interests; hence, it is a fundamental element that
drives financial behavior (Talwar, 2011; Huber et al., 2013; Bhimani, 2009). In the business
context, the concept of risk includes not only the probability of loss but also the consequences of
that loss or risk event (Power, 2004b; Harner, 2010; Talwar, 2011). Historic perspective reveals
that within organizations and organizations in varying industries have taken more of a silo
approach thus managing risk differently and separately (Bromiley, P., McShane, M., Nair, A.,
and Rustambekov, E., 2014). This can be seen, for example, by a finance department addressing
interest rate risks or risk associated with currency, and operations focusing on safety and quality
control risks (Bromiley et al., 2014).
Relative to risk management, it is an intuitive concept and is as much art as it is science
(Doorn, 2013; McCormally et al., 2012; Mikes, 2011). Risk management may be defined as a
process directed towards identifying, evaluating, and determining the risks an organization is
10

exposed to and developing policies, processes, and procedures to monitor and manage the risks
identified (Talwar, 2011; Hall et al., 2013). Some view risk management as the key to the
banking industries continued survival and growth as they are in the business of managing risk,
not avoiding it (Talwar, 2011). Organizations seek to define the most favorable levels of adverse
outcomes based on an assessment of probability and impact, and then focus on those risks
considered unacceptable (Power, 2004b; Huber et al., 2013a; Power, 2009). Risk management
practices are viewed as an efficient and reasonable means to test institution policies, procedures,
processes, practices, and products to reduce the harmful impacts of risk taking without stifling it;
in many ways, risk management is a central corporate governance task as it sustains value
creation (Huber et al., 2013; Mikes, 2008; Andersen et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2007; Pirson, M.,
and Turnbull, S., 2011). This expression of an organization’s risk attitude at the level of the
organization as a whole is referred to as its “risk appetite” and the Committee of the Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) defines it as “the amount of risk, on a
broad level, an entity is willing to accept in pursuit of value” (COSO, 2004; Paape et al., 2012).
The goal of risk management is not viewed as the elimination of all risk, but the pursuit
of sensible and informed risk profiling and decision making toward increased returns (Harner,
2010; Talwar, 2011). Thus some consider that risk management issues demand greater
democracy in the decision process as risk management touches many areas, and that risk
knowledge itself is so uncertain, risk management may not be able to claim any unique authority
(Power, 2004b). Therefore, risk management finds they are presented as risk experts, but
admitting that many areas of relevant knowledge are essentially conjectural (Power, 2004b).
Indeed, in financial institutions, risk management has often been described as a highly abstract
yet analytical activity (Mikes, 2011). McCormally et al. (2012) suggests that financial
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institutions face unique challenges in risk management as they are exposed to traditional
business risks, and also to those inherent in the business of banking—for example, credit risks,
and interest rate risks. Financial institutions operate in a heavily regulated environment that
creates compliance risks of its own, and failure to manage these risks to the satisfaction of
regulators may result in enforcement actions and significant reputational harm (McCormally et
al., 2012).
Empirical work has highlighted the proliferation of risk management into different
domains such as higher education, banking, and agriculture (Huber et al., 2013; Termeer, 2009).
Risk management has been gaining ground in banking, fuelled by regulators and market
participants calls for “good management” that the discipline of risk management practices brings
as a corporate governance and management control practice applicable across all industries
(Mikes, 2009; Power, 2009; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011; Paape et al., 2012; COSO, 2004;
ISO, 2009). Further, their expectations regarding risk management have been rising rapidly,
especially since the recent financial crisis. In that crisis, weaknesses in risk management
practices that included governance side and financial risk modelling issues became visible, and it
seems that the importance of risk management elevates in times of failures or crisis (Mikes,
2011; Harner, 2010). The financial crisis of 2007–2009 led regulators to call for firms to focus
on enterprise-wide risk oversight and institutions faced significant pressure to strengthen their
risk management systems and control practices, and to take appropriate actions to improve
stakeholder value protection (Paape et al., 2012; Bhimani, 2009). Significant public policy
debates and propagated new risk management rules by regulators and standard setters evidenced
these pressures (Paape et al., 2012; Mikes, 2011; Bhimani, 2009). The importance of making
risk management “count” in high-level strategic decisions is perhaps the most agreed upon
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lesson that industry actors are taking from the recent financial crisis (Mikes, 2009). As Mikes’
(2009) noted from a Wall Street quote, “After an era of go–go growth that led firms into
profitable but chancy areas like mortgage securities, the industry is moving toward the kind of
leader who gets down into the nitty-gritty of risk management.”
II.2 Evolution of Risk Management
In light of the recent financial crisis, Power’s (2004) study resonates today in that the risk
management of everything turned out to be the risk management of nothing (Power, 2009;
Mikes, 2011). No other term has received such a significant echo in the media during the global
financial crisis of 2007-2009 than that of risk management (Huber et al., 2013; Power, 2009). In
the approximate 20 years prior to this event, the interest in risk management has steadily
increased (Bhimani, 2009; Huber et al., 2013). Risk management has emerged as a means for
managing potential adverse organizational outcomes by using “probability x impact” frameworks
to define parameters to assess and differentiate acceptable levels of unfavorable outcomes
(Huber et al., 2013a; Jordan, S., Jørgensen, L., and Mitterhofer, H., 2013; Kaplan, R. S., and
Mikes, A., 2012; McCormally et al. 2012). Risk management has shifted from a back-office,
defensive role into a fundamental part of the business model and has emerged as a means of
providing ex-ante rationalizations of the limits of prospective organizational action to optimize
the outcomes of those actions (Huber et al., 2013a; Power, 2004b). This redefines the lens
through which undesirable events can be assessed, tolerated, and managed by organizations
(Huber et al., 2013a).
Some view the rise of risk management is a self-protective reply to a more demanding
organizational environment of consumers and stakeholders (Power, 2004). Power (2004)
indicates that risk management has been characterized by an increasing focus on risk
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management of secondary risk such as reputation risks, which he views as a serious concern to
the concept of risk management and to society. Risk related regulatory reforms, including the
Turnbull report, the listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the U.S.
Department of Justice Sentencing Guidelines, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, significantly
expanded societies’ perspectives and public policies related to effective risk management, and
the rise of this regulatory conception of risk management, finds its roots in internal controls
(Beasley et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2007; Arena et al., 2010; Harner, 2010; ICAEW, 1999; Gates,
2006). Risk management has been high on the agenda of finance practitioners and scholars as its
focus has broadened to include more questions of internal control, and new risk categories
including operational and reputational risks (Mikes, 2009; Huber et al., 2013a). When applied to
areas outside finance departments, traditional statistical-driven techniques gave way to broader
and nebulous methodologies (Huber et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011).
The growth of risk management out of internal controls has evolved risk management
into an intensified focus on auditability of processes, and corresponding trails of documentation
to evidence organizational adherence to interested stakeholders (Power, 2004b; Tekathen, M.,
and Dechow, N., 2013; Bhimani, 2009; Jordan et al., 2013). Power’s (2009) disheartening view
on the growth of risk management - the risk management of nearly everything - was less about
managing risk as it is formally understood and more about organizations creating evidence of
due process. Instead of managing risk, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 found extreme risktaking to have played a pivotal role (Dobbin, 2010), and that risk management may have helped
disguise poor risk practices (Huber et al., 2013).
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II.2.1 Enterprise-wide Risk Management
Yet, risk management continues to be viewed as relevant and important in many
industries and types of organizations and this is especially so when risk management takes on
what many view as its most popular paradigm called enterprise-wide risk management (ERM).
In September 2004, the COSO issued Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework, to
provide a model framework for ERM. The framework defines ERM as:
A process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel,
applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events
that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives (COSO, 2004;
Beasley et al., 2005; Harner, 2010; Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2009; Beasley et al., 2010).
COSO is a coalition of the main accounting and finance trade associations in the United States
and was formed due to the fraudulent financial reporting issues in the mid-1980s (Power, 2009;
COSO, 2004; Power, 2007).
As we discussed, and considering the influence of the internal controls foundation over
risk management, it is important to note COSO’s 1992 Internal Control – Integrated Framework
which suggested that: by calling upon the risk awareness of employees, an internal risk culture
can be created; risk attitudes are aligned with strategies and objectives; hazards and opportunities
are identified in relation to an organization’s objectives; and risks are assessed by the potential
likelihood and impact of their harm (Schiller et al., 2014; COSO, 1992). Schiller et al., (2014)
suggests that organizations risk management is limited due to a lack of the concept of risk and
risk knowledge generation with current ERM frameworks, which may be indicative of why
current risk management has lost sight of the value of integrating risk knowledge bases and risk
management systems. Instead, it seems that the COSO (1992) guidance provides the precursor
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conceptual building blocks for the COSO 2004 ERM as a controls-based approach to risk
management, thus a direct influence on ERM can be traced to an accounting conception of
internal control (Power, 2009).
Hence, the ERM model is strongly influenced by accounting and auditing standards of
control, with an emphasis on detailed controls supported with robust documentation evidencing
effectiveness of the controls (Power, 2009; Talwar, 2011; Jordan et al., 2013). Our proposed risk
governance framework seems warranted as it foundationally rest on risk governance principles
versus emphasizing standards of internal controls which may enhance the understanding of risks
and the ways in which actors and institutions, public and private, deal with risks surrounded by
uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity (van Asselt et al., 2011) that appear to be lacking with
current organizational risk management (Schiller et al., 2014).
Nonetheless, while ERM has various sources feeding the same basic idea, the COSO
(2004) version has become a global framework for best practice (Power, 2009; Paape et al.,
2012; Huber et al., 2013). In a study by Viscelli (2013) 64% of interviewees indicated that they
leveraged COSO as a reference or starting point but did not follow it in detail which is a telling
sign and indicative of the inconsistency in ERMs noted in some research. ERM was viewed as
one response to growing expectations by various stakeholders as a possible effective response to
risk management challenges (Beasley et al., 2005; Paape et al., 2012). Broadly described as a
“process,” ERM requires a business entity to develop an organization-wide, top down approach
to identifying, assessing, managing, and monitoring risks that would prevent the organization
from meeting its objectives and managing risks throughout its operations (Beasley et al., 2005;
Kleffner et al., 2003; Harner, 2010; Pirson et al., 2011; McCormally et al. 2012; Mikes et al.,
2014; Viscelli, 2013; Talwar, 2011; Arena et al., 2010; Jordan et al., 2013). ERM is an
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integrated risk-management framework intended to improve knowledge of and communication
about possible risks throughout the firm, and was designed to increase the boards and senior
management’s ability to oversee these risks (Beasley et al., 2005; Kleffner et al., 2003; Harner,
2010; Pirson et al., 2011; McCormally et al. 2012; Mikes et al., 2014; Viscelli, 2013).
ERM differs from earlier views of risk management with its enterprise focus, and holistic
versus silo approach where strategic, operational, compliance risks, and financial risks, are
addressed concurrently (Paape et al., 2012; Harner, 2010; Kleffner et al., 2003; Schiller et al.,
2014; Gates, 2006; Mikes, 2009). For operational risk, organizations were encouraged to
consider the Basel II regulatory definition, “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems or from external events” (Basel, 2004). Operational risk
is broad and includes costs associated from human error, legal liabilities, natural disasters, and
can include cyber security threats and regulatory fines, while strategic risks covers the hard-toquantify risks that threaten key strategic and business objectives (Basel, 2004; Mikes, 2008;
Andersen et al., 2012; Heltman, 2015). In these secondary risks such as strategy and reputation
risk, we saw efforts to quantify risks in an effort to formalize management’s judgement and
knowledge (Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J., and Nahapiet, J., 1980). The
COSO ERM concept defines risk management using a top-down approach that segments
managerial responsibilities at all levels of decision making and planning (COSO, 2004). It
considers, for example, that “each manager should be accountable to the next higher level for his
or her portion of enterprise risk management, with the CEO ultimately accountable to the board”
(Tekathen et al., 2013; Arena et al., 2010; COSO, 2004). The intent of this integrated approach
was to help companies deal with risks and opportunities more effectively, enhancing the
organization’s ability to create and preserve value for its stakeholders, and to promote more
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efficient use of capital in financial and non-financial institutions alike (Power, 2009; Kleffner et
al., 2003; COSO, 2004).
The COSO ERM is represented as a three-dimensional matrix of eight elements deemed
essential for achieving strategic, operational, reporting and compliance goals (COSO, 2004) and
an organizations risk appetite is a key concept in the COSO ERM framework. Risk appetite
refers to “the amount of risk, on a broad level, an entity is willing to accept in pursuit of value”
(COSO, 2004). This expresses the organization’s risk attitude at the level of the organization as a
whole (Power, 2009; Paape et al., 2012). Risk appetite is the starting point of COSO type ERM,
and according to COSO (2004), consideration and defining of the organizations risk appetite is
essential for successful risk management. Risk appetite may be expressed in qualitative or
quantitative terms, and at lower levels of an organization in the form of risk tolerances that are
subsequently aggregated (COSO, 2004; Power, 2009; Paape et al., 2012; Harner, 2010). While
the design and implementation of ERM is firm specific, it involves mapping the firm's business
strategies and risks. At its core, ERM revolves around efficient and effective communication
and monitoring of the organization's risks against its risk portfolio. In addition to the risk
appetite, organizations are encouraged to develop key risk indicators that facilitate more
effective monitoring of potential risk events (Harner, 2010; COSO, 2004). In 2009, COSO issued
a thought paper, titled Strengthening Enterprise Risk Management for Strategic Advantage, to
discuss the importance of the board's role in ERM and to provide some guidance in strengthening
risk-management practices and complying with anticipated regulatory mandates on risk
management to assist boards in fulfilling their role (Harner, 2010).
Once a company achieves a certain level of ERM sophistication, risk oversight begins to
take on an independent status, and ways this has been signified include the appointment of a
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“chief risk officer” or the transfer of risk oversight to an area such as strategic planning to avoid
possible conflicts of interest in responsibilities (Gates, 2006). The purpose of such independence
was that many organizations used outside auditors to design and establish the ERM objectives
and sought to avoid the conflict of interest inherent in having them then be responsible for
evaluating those same ERM processes (Gates, 2006). To this end, as a professional group, risk
managements role included accommodating the demands of various stakeholder groups:
regulators, corporate executives, shareholders, debt-holders and the general public (Mikes,
2008).
II.2.2 Role of Risk Management
It is believed by some that ERM provides a source of competitive advantage for those
who can demonstrate a strong ERM capability and discipline (Beasley et al., 2005; Lessard, D.,
and Lucea, R., 2009). In Mikes’ (2008) study, the interviewed senior risk officers emphasized
that the risk function creates strategic value when risk professionals partner with the business
lines and help them understand the cost of risk taking. ERM factors from a governance and
organization perspective are: A clearly defined risk appetite articulated through limits and
monitoring procedures; Involvement of the board; Centralized ERM organizational functions in
place; A set of risk committees at both corporate and business unit levels that ensure proper
communication and help to in-still risk awareness into the culture of the business (McDonald,
2004; Schiller et al., 2014; Talwar, 2011). An ERM framework should align the organization
standards and policies, risk measurement methodologies, and systems and tools (McDonald,
2004; Pirson et al., 2011; McCormally et al. 2012; Mikes et al., 2014; Viscelli, 2013).
The role of risk management became more important as rating agencies introduced
requirements and from continued promulgation of risk management by regulation. In May 2008,
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Standard & Poor’s announced its efforts in evaluating an issuer’s ERM processes as an
additional component of their credit evaluation procedures (Standard & Poor’s, 2008). In March
2010, the Securities & Exchange Commission amended required proxy disclosures by requiring
publicly traded companies to begin describing the board’s role in risk management practices
(Beasley et al., 2010; McCormally et al. 2012). While many financial institutions were already
subject to, or encouraged to act by, these requirements, it was not until 2010 that the DFA
created statutory ERM requirements explicitly for financial institutions (McCormally et al. 2012;
Bugalla, J., Kallman, J., and Narvaez, K., 2014; McDonald, 2004; Martin et al., 2007). Changes
in NYSE governance rules include requirements for NYSE registrant audit committees to assume
responsibilities with respect to ‘‘risk assessment and risk management,’’ including risks beyond
financial reporting (Beasley et al., 2005; NYSE, 2003). Basel Committee’s Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision, require regulators of banks to ensure that all banks in their
country have in place a suitable risk management process to identify, measure, monitor and
control risks (Talwar, 2011). This, in part, pressed regulatory agencies to become more explicit
about having a risk-based approach to regulation. Regulators have repeatedly emphasized five
areas: effective structural governance, robust and independent internal audit functions, consistent
flow of risk-related information to the highest levels of the institution, instilling a strong
corporate culture, and early identification of risks (McCormally et al., 2012).
Some recent studies have provided perspectives on the roles that risk management plays
in organizations and determined that it can depend on the type of “calculative culture” within the
organization (Mikes, 2008). Mikes’ (2011) study identified two types of risk management: one
driven by a strong shareholder value imperative (risk management by the numbers), the other
corresponding to the demands of the risk-based internal control imperative (holistic risk

20

management). The differences in the two styles are attributed to the calculative culture of
“quantitative enthusiasm” and “quantitative scepticism” (Mikes, 2009; Mikes, 2008). This
shapes management preferences towards risk management, hence impacting the role that risk
management plays in an organization. “Quantitative enthusiasts” aim to replace judgmental risk
assessments with risk quantification whereas “quantitative sceptics” turn to risk modelling with
caution, and are wary of managing risks by numbers and rely more on executive judgement
(Mikes, 2009; Talwar, 2011). In light of the new regulatory requirements in financial
institutions, it is not surprising that risk managers are under pressure and are tasked by boards
and senior leadership to be able to demonstrate how the organization is meeting its risk
management responsibilities (Mikes, 2008). Hence, the role of risk management also includes
the production of risk reports, risk maps, stress test, and scenario analysis, and to also satisfy
regulatory expectations (Mikes, 2009; Mikes et al., 2014; Jordan et al., 2013). Risk maps are
based on risk identification and assessment processes, stress tests are based on data collection
and statistical analysis, and scenario analyses are based on possible risk events that the
organization may find itself impacted by (Mikes, 2009; Mikes et al., 2014; Jordan et al., 2013).
In particular, regulators will look to see whether the information reaches senior management and
whether and under what circumstances information reaches the Audit Committee, Risk
Committee, and board (McCormally et al., 2012).
From a scholar’s perspective one might believe that, with such an abundance of
principles, guidelines, and standards, risk management is a mature discipline with clear and
proven concepts and tools used by organizations in practice (Mikes, 2014). However, this does
not appear to be the case as risk management systems are largely unproven and still emerging
(Mikes, 2014). Many organizations are not implementing ERM’s (Viscelli, 2013) and if they
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are, they are creating their own hybrid systems to manage risk (Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2011;
Jordan et al., 2013; Mikes, 2014). This is impactful as it makes it difficult to ascertain whether
or not risk management systems such as ERM are creating their supposed value (Huber et al.,
2013a; Mikes, 2008; Andersen et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2007; Pirson et al., 2011). Also, while
some of the studies discussed provide perspectives on the role that risk management plays in
organizations, the wide variety in risk management systems makes it challenging to understand
the dynamics and components impacting risk management practices which affects the research in
this space. Further, many practitioners have expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed
normative and regulatory ERM frameworks (Mikes, 2014; Paape et al., 2012; Arena et al., 2010).
Research into barriers to effective risk management is needed and our study seeks to provide a
sound risk governance framework with which to explore what these barriers may be.
II.3 Challenges of Risk Management
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has negatively impacted the reputation of risk
management as a suitable response to uncertainty (Huber et al., 2013; Tekathen et al., 2013).
Some literature indicates that organizational focus is on adhering to expectations and avoiding
potential blame by evidencing their conformance to regulatory requirements and document trails.
Indeed, Power (2009) suggest that ERM might be better termed the ‘risk management of
nothing’ being nothing more than an emblematic response to a growing audit culture, with little
and even dysfunctional, impacts on routine operations (Huber et al., 2013a). This focus on
auditability by interested stakeholders may cause organizations to overlook perhaps weaker
indicators that may actually point towards risks (Power, 2004; Huber et al., 2013; Tekathen et al.,
2013). In turn, organizations address what is referred to as policy risks thus prompting
organization focus on meeting and adhering to policy actions called for by regulators and
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governments (Ghoshal, 1987). Hence, we can see the evolved accounting or internal controls
based risk management systems serving as organizational compliance mechanisms or
“rationalization machines” which have been implicated as the reason for some company’s
failure, as risk management was relegated to a compliance function (Ghoshal, 1987; Beasley et
al., 2010; Mikes et al., 2014; Burchell et al., 1980; Kaplan et al., 2012). Organizations can then
project an illusion of control to sustain external legitimacy while doing little in practice to
actually manage problems (Huber et al., 2013a; Martin et al., 2007; Powers, 2004).
The perception that risk management was part of a “tools culture” driven by concerns for
audit and control undermined the extent to which organizations felt it could improve decisionmaking (Huber et al., 2013a). Hence, many people question the value in investing further in
their organizations risk management system and practices (Beasley et al., 2010). This effect may
be compounded by the notion that as it enters the organization, risk management systems such as
ERM inevitably encounter other legacy risk management systems or practices which introduces
variations in risk management practices (Arena et al., 2010). Most financial institutions have
some kind of risk management system in place, but most of these systems are piecemeal
approaches, which is further accentuated as many organization leaders believe their ad hoc and
informal approaches are adequate and appropriate (Talwar, 2011; Beasley et al., 2010).
ERM may be relevant for regulators and others in need of proof of good governance as
existing top-down designs for ERM are valued by regulators seeking to make senior
management accountable, but such approaches are not realistic as it has become progressively
detached from the reality of modern financial organizations and are not grounded in the demand
for management action, which is always somehow “outside” the framework (Martin et al., 2007).
Indeed, the recurring instances of risk management system weaknesses have often been
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implicated as a contributor to the widespread failure of managerial and regulatory intelligence
suggesting that the approach to, or implementation of, risk management practices is deficient in
some respect (Power, 2009; Harner, 2010; Beasley et al., 2010). This indicates room for
improving underlying processes and procedures to strengthen an organization’s identification,
assessment, and reporting of key risk exposures arising across all aspects of the organization
(Power, 2009; Harner, 2010; Beasley et al., 2010). To this end, identifying barriers to effective
risk management may bridge the gap between literature and practice in the field of risk
management thus providing practitioners the ability to draw from these factors to better focus
their limited resource on those things which really make the difference between success and
failure (Yaraghi et al., 2011). Research into identifying barriers to effective risk management is
needed to help provide such insights and perspectives to risk management professionals and
academia alike.
II.3.1 Barriers to Risk Management
Current assessment still finds that empirical work on ERM is limited and can be
classified along three main lines of research – describing the ERM practice, analyzing the
determinants of ERM adoption, and assessing the valuation effect of ERM (Eckles, D. L., Hoyt,
R. E., and Miller, S. M., 2014). In most cases, our review of risk management literature has
found that the focus of the articles was not explicitly to seek barriers to effective risk
management, however, our analysis has identified certain salient themes relative to barriers to
effective risk management which can be categorized as strategy, organization structure,
organization culture, communication, bias, process design/tools, and a final theme of the barrier
being the concept of risk management itself. These are not presented as an exhaustive list, but the
perspectives provide views of possible barriers to effective risk management.
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It does not appear that literature supports that organizations are linking ERM to strategy
(Viscelli, 2013). Poor level of board involvement and strategic oversight was found to be
impactful towards ensuring the firms risk appetite was broadly understood in the organization
(McCormally et al. 2012). In one case study, it appeared that a banks inability to secure the faith
of the board in strategic discussions affected its risk management capabilities (Mikes, 2009).
Organization structure led to a great deal of variability in a study where the multiplicity of local
risk management circles throughout the firm led to data inconsistencies (Tekathen et al., 2013).
Organizations may recognize certain risks and potential events were important, but in practice,
there was no overarching strategy or process design, hence it was not clear who in the
organization owned responsibility for “information objects” (Tekathen et al., 2013). One study
found that a deterrent to risk management systems such as ERM was an organization structure
that discouraged ERM (Kleffner et al., 2003).
Organizational culture was found to be a major deterrent to risk management as risk
management practices were discouraged and resistance to change was constant; some studies
reflected a rebellious tone where risk management practices were treated by managers as
unavoidable tasks imposed by the parent company that did not add value to their existing
knowledge (Kleffner et al., 2003; Arena et al., 2010). One study’s finding suggested that the
observed poor risk management practices could be linked to an unhealthy organizational culture
which played a significant role in the failure to implement sound risk management practices
(Andersen et al., 2012). “Mind-sets” can be impacted as a study showed that less attention was
paid to those issues where responsibilities were shared, which suggested that rather than
challenging organizational practices, it acted as a force toward organizational conservatism thus
reinforcing existing understanding and practice (Huber et al., 2013a). As noted in a recent Wall
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Street article, Thomas Baxter, general counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated
in a speech on culture, “I confess that proof is hard to come by, yet I am not alone in the
fundamental belief that a strong organizational culture will lead to better behaviour” (Glazer, E.,
and Rexrode, C., 2015). Organizational culture has also been found to negatively impact the
notion of accountability as a study noted that accountability became an object of desire rather
than an effect of their practice (Tekathen et al., 2013). Organization culture was identified in a
study of Malaysian public companies of independent non-executive directors as impacting, or
being barriers to, their effectiveness in performing their roles (Annuar, 2012). Organizational
culture has been widely held to be the major barrier to creating and leveraging knowledge assets
and in one study of policy formulation contributed to the observed fear of undermining an
existing policy (David, W., and Fahey, L., 2000; Termeer, 2009).
Harner’s (2010) research noted apparent weaknesses in communication as risk managers
rarely discussed or assessed the company's overall risk profile and instead confined their risk
management to separate and individual silos. Communication challenges can come in the form
of pressure to conform due to positive feedback loops as Hindmoor and McConnell’s (2013)
study found that where a policy is perceived as being generally successful, a positive feedback
emerges where pressures to extend a policy form resulting in risk signals being discounted.
Harm in the form of miscommunication may arise as a study by Huber et al. (2013a) suggested
that while the language of risk created a common “currency” with which to communicate, it also
created potential for serious miscommunication as risk assessments communicated the most
likely impacts of policy options, and paid little attention to related uncertainties. Communication
through documentation can present challenges as the more parties touch the documents, the
communicated character of specific issues can become opaque with each additional review
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(Tekathen et al., 2013). Timeliness in communication of risk information was realized in one
study where the needs for timelier and firmer signals to decision makers were identified (Mikes,
2009). The lack of communication in the form of organizational silence is a paradox where most
employees know the truth about certain issues and problems yet do not speak of it to their
supervisors (Morrison, E. W., and Milliken, F. J., 2000).
Relative to bias, organizations may be pressured to deliver upon immediate goals which
results in bias toward the preservation of existing institution policies and procedures leading to
minimizing the need to clarify and communicate risks (Hindmoor et al., 2013; Harner, 2010;
Termeer, 2009). Mikes (2014) indicates that organizational biases, such as “groupthink,” which
is akin to organizational silence, also inhibit good thinking about risks. Groupthink arises when
individuals, still in doubt about a course of action that the majority has approved, decide to keep
quiet and go along (Mikes, 2014; Morrison et al., 2000).
Process design/tools challenges can be seen in circumstances where risk management
practices were not able to be supported by the risk applications and infrastructure (Martin et al.,
2007). In Mikes’ (2009) study, process design may have proved impactful as the process of
treating “red signals” were treated as learning opportunities which prompted revisions of limits
versus the process being designed to risk manage and intervene. Power’s (2009) study indicated
potential process design issues where the need to embed “risk management and internal control
systems within business processes” was an understood imperative, yet, there was little
elaboration of what that might involve. Termeer’s (2009) case study found that the framing of a
situation as a crisis or a race to reach a deadline put additional pressure on the process, causing
managers to fall back on methods and tactic’s they were familiar with. Tools or risk models was
a point of challenge for a bank in Mikes’ (2009) study in that risk personnel spent a great deal of
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time on calculating how much risk they had and ignored the bigger picture. Further, a risk
controller in the study was not convinced that a risk tool was able to accurately reflect the
underlying risk exposure and its dynamics (Mikes, 2009).
Some studies question facets of risk management including the paradigm ERM and the
notion of risk silos. Tekathen et al. (2013) suggest that the implementation of ERM does not
ensure organizational risk management but instead actualizes the ambiguity and heterogeneity of
organizational risk practices. Paape et al. (2012) indicated that they found no evidence that
application of the COSO framework improves risk management effectiveness to help
organizations establish sound risk management (Schiller et al., 2014). One study identified an
obstacle to risk management being the existence of the silo risk mentality (Kleffner et al., 2003).
Hall et al.’s (2013) study expressed the negative of the organization having compartmentalized
risk, i.e., operation risk, credit risk, market risk, and reputation risk, when they should be viewed
as all interacting. A top Federal Reserve official said the central bank is still grappling with how
to quantify certain types of risk for which incidents are unpredictable such as operational risk at
the largest banks much less identify reliable controls to manage them (Heltman, 2015).
As can be seen above, while most of the studies did not explicitly seek to identify barriers
to effective risk management, our analysis reveals the identification of several factors that may
denote barriers to effective risk management. The study by Cho et al. (2014) identified that going
through the process of creating RPs a benefit was improved risk management and knowing the
organization better, yet, most of these institutions subject to RP undoubtedly had some level of
risk management practices prior to DFA (McCormalley et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes,
2011; Harner, 2010). We seek to explore what are barriers to effective risk management.
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II.3.2 Proposed Risk Governance Framework
Yaraghi et al. (2011) developed critical success factors related to risk management and
developed them in a way to show how these factors relate to each other, and how RMS strategies
can be defined, monitored, and controlled to provide adequate treatment to these factors from the
time a organization decides to implement RMS, during the project of design and implementation,
and finally throughout the life of the RMS. Our adapted three phases of RMS, readiness,
execution, and administration is the first component of our proposed risk governance framework
(RGF). We view these phases as part of an on-going feedback loop that should not be viewed as
strictly linear. This is important as risk management and governance in institutions change over
time, hence; for example, the organization may need to transition from administration back to
readiness to consider new risk events and its impact to the organization and the RGF. With the
variety of organization’s risk management structures in existence, it would be very difficult to
generalize a mapping or alignment of our three phases to an organization risk management
systems/practices. Part of the strength of our proposed RGF is to provide flexibility for
practitioners and academia to leverage this framework at all levels of an organization’s risk
management systems/practices and in a variety of industries. Hence, one should readily be able
to consider the correlation of the three phases to their respective organizations risk management
systems/practices. For example, from a responsibility perspective, one could consider that all
three phases would be led by senior executives and committees with perhaps certain facets of the
phases aligned with middle/lower level management and committees, e.g., while “strategy”
approval during the readiness phase may require board approval, “process design”
responsibilities during the execution phase may have more involvement of middle level
management and committees.
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We also draw from recent studies that provide opportunities to refine the success factors
underlying the RMS and enhance the conceptualization of the three phases. We refined the
factors and phases by drawing from Mikes’ (2014) study which suggests three ERM design
parameters and three contingency variables classifying different types of risk events. The three
design parameters (see Table 30 for more details) are, (1) Processes for identifying, assessing,
and prioritizing risks; (2) Frequency of risk meetings; and (3) Risk tools. Mikes (2014)
identified these parameters as an “ERM mix,” and as fundamental components of risk
management. The three contingency variables classify different types of risk events (see Table
30 for more details) as, (1) Preventable risks; (2) Strategic execution risks; and (3) External risks.
Specifically, we enhanced the CSF Process design to reflect the three design parameters and the
three types of risk events. We also enhanced the CSF Environment to reflect External risks. As
Mikes’ (2014) study indicates that organizations risks are contingent on context and
circumstances, she offers these as ideas about what risk management may depend on.
In Lundqvist’s (2014) study, she identified four pillars that are integral to the
implementation of an ERM (see Table 31 for more details) as, (1) General internal environment
and objective setting; (2) General control activities and information and communication; (3)
Holistic organization of risk management; and (4) Specific risk identification and risk assessment
activities. Interestingly, relative to pillars 1 and 2, she found these components are not directly
associated with risk management; firms that demonstrate no risk management activities could
still implement these two components in a robust way, for example, if they have strong
governance in place. Hence, conceptualizing dimensions or components by separating riskrelated dimensions or components from those that are not directly related to risk could be a way
to improve RMS (Lundqvist, 2014). Given our three phases, we refined our RMS by aligning
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pillar 1 to readiness and pillar’s 2, 3, and 4 to readiness, execution and administration.
Furthermore, Lundqvist (2014) suggests a more consolidated framework with “broader
components” as existing frameworks may offer too many components. This may provide better
guidance with risk management frameworks as her study showed that organizations do not
implement ERM based on existing component definitions and instead implement on broader
terms. Our RMS aligns with this suggestion with three broader phases aligned to the four pillars.
This may provide a framework for practitioners to draw from as it separates risk and non-risk
related phases, i.e., readiness, and conceptualizes components on a broader level, i.e., readiness,
execution, and administration.
The growth of risk management out of internal controls has in turn evolved risk
management into an intensified focus on process, and on auditable trails of documentation thus
supporting the need for external display of internal organizational coherence (Power, 2004b;
Tekathen et al., 2013; Bhimani, 2009; Jordan et al., 2013). Although COSO’s 1992 Internal Integrated Framework suggested more of a risk awareness and internal risk culture, instead, it
seems that the COSO (1992) guidance provided the conceptual building blocks for the COSO
2004 ERM as a controls-based approach to risk management, thus a direct influence on ERM can
be traced to an accounting conception of internal control (Power, 2004). This drives
organizations to create elaborate trails of detailed controls with corresponding documentation to
prove the quality of processes (Power, 2009; Martin et al., 2007; Talwar, 2011; Jordan et al.,
2013). Schiller et al. (2014) suggests that organizations risk management is limited due to a lack
of the concept of risk and risk knowledge generation with current ERM frameworks, which may
be indicative of why current risk management has lost sight of the value of integrating risk
knowledge bases and risk management systems.

31

The notion of “risk governance” has been coined only recently and is generally linked to
efforts related to “TRUSTNET – concerted action on risk governance” (van Asselt et al., 2011).
The concept of risk governance pertains to the various ways in which many actors, individuals,
and institutions, public and private, deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or
ambiguity (van Asselt et al., 2011). Risk governance provides a conceptual as well as normative
basis for how to deal responsibly with uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks in particular
(van Asselt et al., 2011). However, research suggests that COSO ERM does not address the
management of uncertainties (Tekathen et al., 2013). Risk principles may serve as guidance for
practitioners as they need to understand how different individuals and groups within
organizations define risk, potential biases in risk assessment, and challenges in implementing
risk management initiatives as many risks cannot be calculated on the basis of probability and
effects alone (Bromiley et al., 2014; van Asselt et al., 2011). Risk governance highlights the
importance of uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks; however, it is a consistent finding
that in most of these cases, the risks are treated, assessed, and managed as if they were simple
(van Asselt et al., 2011). Perhaps it is the uncertainty around what constitutes risk which lends it
the capacity to alter, define, and reshape risk management activities in particular ways (Bhimani,
2009). The lack of precise definitional characteristics enables the concept of risk to effect
organizational risk management by conferring legitimacy on redefining boundaries of risk
management (Bhimani, 2009). The failures to deal adequately with risks such as the financial
crisis demonstrate the need to develop alternative concepts and approaches to deal with
uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks (van Asselt et al., 2011).
We therefore draw from van Asselt et al.’s (2011) risk governance study. While there
may be other risk governance principles, van Asselt et al.’s (2011) study synthesized the body of
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scholarly ideas and proposals on governance of systemic risks and explicates the idea that risk
management is to help risk professionals to familiarize themselves with a broader concept of
risk. We view that what may be missing from these normative RMS frameworks are underlying
guidelines that can inform thinking about how to deal with uncertain, complex and/or ambiguous
risks in various contexts. We adapted van Asselt et al.’s (2011) set of three principles which are
(see Table 32 for more details), (1) Communication and Inclusion; (2) Integration; and (3)
Reflection. These principles should be read as a synthesis of what needs to be seriously
considered in organizing structures and processes to manage risks (van Asselt et al., 2011).
Schiller et al., (2014) notes organizational failure to recognize the value of communication as it
can result in poor integration of risk knowledge bases and risk management systems. Bromiley
et al. (2014) suggests that as underlying strategic choices strongly influence firm-level risk, then
risk management efforts at lower levels may have limited value, hence it is important to consider
communication and inclusion with risk management practices. Risk management should be
embedded and integrated in the company's cultural and organizational fabric that it is barely
noticeable as a distinct management function at either the strategic or tactical level (Lessard et
al., 2009). The integration principle may provide guidance as risk management requires
coordination so that decisions made at one level in the organization do not result in the creation
of new risks at other levels (Lessard et al., 2009). Reflection is important as it is difficult for risk
governance to be routinized (van Asselt et al., 2011); managers make decisions based on what
they believe and often their beliefs differ greatly from objective measures of risk (Bromiley et
al., 2014). Also, individuals or organizations do not make consistent risk judgments or have
consistent risk preferences, hence, the incorporation of the risk governance reflection principle,
may enhance understanding managerial mental models of cause and effect for hard-to-measure
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types of risk (Bromiley et al., 2014; van Asselt et al., 2011). We refined and enhanced our RMS
by utilizing these three risk principles to function as underlying guiding principles to managing
risks, which completes our refinements and enhancement to the RMS thus resulting in the RGF
(see Table 33 for more details).
II.3.3 Summary
Our research on barriers to effective risk management through the lens of the RGF, which
as Table 33 shows, incorporates the RMS enhanced as noted above, provides an RGF with an
RMS empirically grounded in success factors and corresponding phases, and risk theory based
principles serving as underlying guiding principles to enhance risk management, will provide
rich perspectives on barriers to effective risk management. We view the proposed RGF as a
model that may provide practitioners a more practical framework to draw from to enhance their
organizations ability to address "organizational realities" (Arena et al., 2010, Martin et al., 2007)
versus providing a mere auditability of risk management practices (Power, 2004; Huber et al.,
2013; Tekathen et al., 2013). By leveraging our proposed RGF, we can explore the various
phases of RMS where barriers to effective risk management may arise thus creating
unanticipated effects. We provide practitioners a model to draw from that foundationally rest on
risk governance principles versus internal control basis, which may enhance the understanding of
risk governance and the various ways in which many actors, individuals, and institutions, public
and private, deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity (van Asselt
et al., 2011) that appear to be lacking with current organizational risk management (Schiller et
al., 2014). Lastly, we do not necessarily portray the RGF as an enterprise-wide risk management
system, but more so a model that may be drawn upon by practitioners in varying industries and at
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all levels of an organization’s risk management practices (Talwar, 2011). Figure 1 depicts the
RGF.

Figure 1 Risk Governance Framework
II.3.4 Research Model
The study by Cho et al. (2014) identified that going through the process of creating RPs
benefits cited by respondents were improved risk management and knowing the organization
better, yet, most of these institutions subject to RP undoubtedly had some level of risk
management practices prior to DFA (McCormalley et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011;
Harner, 2010). We seek to explore barriers to effective risk management for the 130 institutions
subject to the RP requirements of DFA. We draw from Yaraghi et al.’s (2011) RMS study, which
identified critical success factors to RMS to explore barriers to effective risk management. We
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adapted as three phases of RMS, readiness, execution, and administration, and some of the noted
success factors, to explore these barriers. Figure 2 is the conceptual framework leveraging the
RGF.
Figure 2 RGF conceptual framework
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Figure 2 RGF conceptual framework
We will seek to obtain the perspectives of the respondents and based on our review of the
survey results, we will test the following hypotheses:
H1 - Both RMs and REGs will not view Readiness factors as barriers to effective risk
management.
H2 - RMs will have a higher perception than REGs that Execution factors are barriers to
effective risk management.
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H3 - REGs will have a higher perception than RMs that Administration factors are
barriers to effective risk management.
Relative to the three risk governance principles, as van Asselt et al. (2011) expressed that
her study does not provide a model in the strict sense of the word, there is no prior empirical
research performed on the three risk principles as adapted to the RGF, therefore, our analysis is
structured around a research question (i.e., survey question 5; see the questionnaire located in
Appendix B) and focusing on analyzing those results rather than testing the theory. Hence, we
will review the survey results and test the following hypothesis:
H4 - Both RMs and REGs will view Risk principles as favorable towards effective risk
management.
Our survey data comes from institutions subject to RPs and many of these institutions
most likely have risk management practices in place and/or underway and many may have
enterprise-wide risk programs in place or underway. As we seek to explore barriers to effective
"risk management" and not just "enterprise -wide" practices, we control for this plausible factor
by focusing on the three phases of readiness, execution, and administration and the variables to
subscribe to the notion of "risk management" practices and not just "enterprise-wide" practices.
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III CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
III.1 Research Approach
The goal of this research is explore barriers to effective risk management. Based on
survey data from 130 institutions subject to the RP requirements of DFA, and certain regulatory
agency’s examiners and analyst, we explored these barriers using our proposed RGF as the lens
through which we performed the analysis. Appendix B has the survey questionnaire we used in
this study. The survey questions were adapted from Yaraghi et al.’s (2011) study which defined
critical success factors and their properties for risk management systems and from Cho et al.’s
(2014) study on perceptions of the effectiveness of RPs. The questions asked were designed to
reveal possible barriers to effective risk management in the phases of readiness, execution, and
administration. We also explored perspectives relative to the three risk principles (van Asselt et
al., 2011) that serve as guiding principles for the RGF. We complimented the results from our
Likert-type scaled survey with several open ended questions and the feedback provided to those.
Therefore, we chose a mixed methods approach as the qualitative results may provide richer
insights into the quantitative analysis findings (Venkatesh, 2013).
III.2 Data Collection
Our sampling of experts had two criteria, such that respondents are (1) involved in or
knowledgeable about risk management systems and practices and (2) currently employed in the
financial industry or serve as a financial industry expert (REG) (Cho et al, 2014). We identified
the financial industry individual as risk management personnel (RM) at the 130 financial
institutions subject to RP requirements. We defined RMs as the members of financial
institutions who are responsible for the firm’s risk management activities. REGs are employed
by the Federal Reserve District Banks (Fed), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
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(OCC), the Federal Reserve System (Board), or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and involved in the oversight of one of the 130 RPs.
To locate RMs and REGs with firsthand knowledge of risk management
systems/practices, we contacted approximately 650 Fed, FDIC, and OCC regulators with job
titles of “Examiner” or “Analyst,” including Board personnel responsible for the supervision and
regulation of the financial institutions, as well as bankers with explicit titles or responsibilities
relative to risk management. All 12 Fed’s were included. We also solicited information from
approximately 130 LinkedIn members currently employed by the approximately 130 institutions
whose public profiles suggested possible responsibilities for risk management oversight. The
questionnaire is comprised of 20 questions: 7 quantitative and 8 open-ended, qualitative items;
there was also one question that served to identify the respondent as RM and REG; three
questions captured demographic information; and one question captured whether or not the
respondent would like to obtain a summary of the study. We collected the data between June 15,
2015 and August 8, 2015.
First, we asked potential respondents to identify the type of organization that currently
employed them. The options provided to respondents included, “Financial institution” and
“Government regulatory agency.”
Second, respondents selected their responses on a Likert-type, seven-point scale on their
views of barriers to effective risk management systems/practices in the phases of readiness,
execution, and administration. We also measured their perspectives on the three risk principles
and the value they placed on these principles towards effective risk governance and risk
management. Eight open-ended questions helped us gain insight into what these expert
respondents viewed as barriers to effective risk management, including factors shaping

39

perceptions of risk management, as well as what changes they would suggest to improve the
effectiveness of risk management systems/practices. A weighted response question asked
respondents to choose, from a list of nine possible barriers that we gathered from previous
literature, which ones they believe are barriers to effective risk management.
III.3 Data Analysis
III.3.1 Quantitative Data
Our statistical tests include Independent Samples T-Test to evaluate differences between
RMs and REGs relative to the phases of RMS and perspectives as to the extent that barriers to
effective risk management exist in the phases of readiness, execution, or administration. We
performed independent samples t-test to evaluate perspectives of the importance of the three risk
principles towards effective risk management and to rank the respondents response to a weighted
response question that asked respondents to choose, from a list of nine possible types of barriers
that we gathered from previous literature, which ones they believe are barriers to effective risk
management. To examine differences between RMs and REGs, we summed for each variable
the numerical values of each of our subscales including the three phases of readiness, execution,
and administration and took the mean to produce the total score (Burns, 2008).
III.3.2 Qualitative Data
The responses to our eight open-ended questions were analyzed and coded in accordance
with descriptive coding methods (Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., and Saldana, J., 2014). First,
one author reviewed the responses to the open-ended Question 8 (see in Appendix B) and
applied a content analysis technique to develop phrase categories or coded responses based on
each respondent’s response to the question (Myers, 2009). The barriers listed in our Question 7
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(see in Appendix B), were used to help shape the coded responses. Still, the majority of our
coded responses emerged through Inductive coding from our collected data (Miles et al., 2014).
Second, the same author reviewed the responses in the remaining seven open-ended
questions and used where possible the coded responses generated from Question 8. Myers
(2009) content analysis technique was employed to develop additional coded responses based on
each respondent’s response to each of the seven remaining open-ended questions where
necessary. As a result, each of the eight open-ended questions reflected a set of coded responses
and some of the coded responses were applicable to more than one open-ended question.
Third, we invited two REGs who were participants in the survey, and hence familiar with
the survey tool, to code the eight open-ended questions. We did not seek to utilize a RM as one
of the coders, as the nature of the topic and interaction by “banker” along with “regulator”
generated angst and raised concerns of confidentiality. Independently, each REG applied the
content analysis technique (Myers, 2009), but utilized the coded responses that were previously
identified for each of the eight open-ended questions by the one author.
Fourth, the one author obtained the completed coded responses from both REGs and
consolidated the three independent coded responses. This was performed for each open-ended
question. This first cycle coding identified differences in the coded responses assigned. This
was attributed to the fact that some of the open-ended questions elicited broad responses for a
single question from a respondent.
Fifth, we collaborated on determining the common coded response and on determining
common themes, for each respondent’s response in each of the eight open-ended questions, to
summarize them. For intercoder reliability, the first cycle coding ranged in agreement from 58
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percent to 92 percent and 98 percent to 100 percent after the second cycle (Miles et al., 2014).
Table 1 reflects the cycle percentages by the eight open-ended questions.
Table 1 Intercoder Reliability
Question

First cycle

Second cycle

Number *

%

%

8

69

99

9

89

100

10/11

92

100

12

72

99

13

74

99

14

70

98

15

58

99

16

68

99

*There were approximately eight open-ended questions seeking various
perspectives relative to RMS. These questions are covered in more detail below.
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IV CHAPTER 4 RESULTS
IV.1 Comparison of RMs and REGs
Table 2 provides descriptive profiles of our respondent group of 41 RMs and 96 REGs
who completed our survey. Many of our respondents are overwhelmingly male, 78% and 77%
for RMs and REGs respectively, and a large majority had four year college degrees (32% and
33% for RM and REG respectively), some postgraduate (7% and 17% for RM and REG
respectively), and postgraduate degrees (59% and 49% for RM and REG respectively). The
respondent group was represented by a broad age range but most were 35 years or older, with the
largest percentage population in the age range of 45-54 at 44% and 38% for RMs and REGs
respectively.
Table 2 Descriptive Profiles
Profile *

RM and
REG **
RM

Gender ***
REG

Education

RM
REG
RM
REG
RM
REG
RM
REG

Age

RM
REG
RM
REG
RM
REG
RM
REG
RM
REG

Descriptor
Male
Female
Male
Female
Some college, no degree (includes community
college)
Four year college or university degree/Bachelor’s
degree (e.g., BS, BA, AB)
Some postgraduate or professional schooling, no
postgraduate degree
Postgraduate or professional degree, including
master’s, doctorate, medical or law degree (e.g.,
MA, MS, PhD, MD, JD)
Less than 25 years old
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 or older

n
31
9
72
22
1
1
13
32
3
16
24

Percent
78%
22%
77%
23%
2%
1%
32%
33%
7%
17%
59%

47

49%

0
1
1
7
12
25
18
36
10
27

0%
1%
2%
7%
29%
26%
44%
38%
24%
28%

*We provide profile prospective of our respondent groups.
** Respondent groups are RM (Risk Managers) and REG (Regulators).
*** The total number of RMs is 41 and REGs is 96, however, 3 (1 RM and 2 REG) did not provide their Gender.
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Our research provides rich perspectives on barriers to effective risk management. This
includes their views obtained from open-ended questions on compensation practices, the current
unique banking environment with the concept of “too big to fail” providing perhaps a type of
“insurance” in that some organizations would be “bailed out,” how complete risk management
systems/practices should be to be “effective,” the impact of the state of the financial/economic
environment in shaping perceptions of effective risk management, barriers to effective risk
management leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, whether current risk management
practices are more “quantitatively” or “qualitatively” driven, and finally what changes they
would suggest to improve the effectiveness of risk management systems/practices.
We conducted Independent Samples T-Test to evaluate our four hypotheses and to
facilitate analysis of mean scores for our one weighted response question to rank the respondents
perspectives on the list of nine possible barriers. For our H1, that both RMs and REGs will not
view Readiness factors as barriers to effective risk management revealed that RMs and REGs do
not differ significantly in terms of Readiness factors (see Table 3), such that both groups
expressed moderately strong views that weaknesses in these Readiness factors may manifest
barriers to effective risk management.
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Table 3 Summary of Readiness Independent Samples T-Test
Mean

t*

Sig

Readiness Factor Variables

RM

REG

Readiness - Poorly defined strategy

5.56

5.81

-.88

.38

5.80

6.34

-1.94

.06

6.05

5.96

.42

.68

4.61

4.52

.30

.77

(Strategy is defined as the organizations
vision, mission, and long-term
objectives.)
Readiness - Poor organization culture
(Organization culture is defined to include
staff morale and commitment, and
flexibility to change.)
Readiness - Lack of appropriate resources
(Resources is defined to include
infrastructure including human resources,
and technical resources (cost and time are
included in this category.)
Readiness - External environment in
which the organization is operating
(Environment is defined to include the
effects of market, suppliers, competitors,
socio-political systems, and the
organization’s partnership and joint
venture strategies.)
*We tested hypothesis 1 - Both RMs and REGs will not view Readiness factors as barriers to effective risk
management.

For our H2, that RMs will have a higher perception than REGs that Execution factors are
barriers to effective risk management revealed that RMs and REGs do not differ significantly in
terms of Execution factors (see Table 4), such that both groups expressed strong views that
weaknesses in these Execution factors may manifest barriers to effective risk management.
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Table 4 Summary of Execution Independent Samples T-Test
Mean

t*

Sig

Execution Factor Variables

RM

REG

Execution - Poorly understood strategy

5.46

5.73

-.89

.38

5.95

6.08

-.57

.57

6.20

6.53

-1.53

.13

5.85

6.07

-.93

.35

(Strategy is defined as the organizations
vision, mission, and long-term
objectives.)
Execution - Poor process design (Process
design is defined to include processes for
identifying, assessing, and prioritizing
risks; frequency of risk meetings; and risk
tools design; and availability of
documented process ownerships for the
organization’s internal processes.)
Execution - Lack of accountability
(Accountability is defined to include
defined job roles/responsibilities, and the
level of employee involvement in risk
management systems/practices.)
Execution - Inadequate risk performance
reporting (Performance reporting is
defined to include risk measurement,
monitoring, and feedback reporting.)
*We tested hypothesis 2 - RMs will have a higher perception than REGs that Execution factors are barriers to
effective risk management.

For our H3, that REGs will have a higher perception than RMs that Administration
factors are barriers to effective risk management revealed that the “Administration – Inadequate
levels of top management support of risk management systems/practices” factor was statistically
significantly different (RM M = 5.88, REG M = 6.48; t = -2.14, p = .04), such that REGs more
strongly viewed this Administration factor as manifesting barriers to effective risk management
systems/practices than RMs (see Table 5). The difference in this factor reveals perhaps a level of
skepticism that REGs may have as part of their supervisory oversight in dealing with top
management that may not exist with RMs working under that management. It could boil down
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to a level of confidence issue.

However, similar to Readiness and Execution phases, both

respondent groups expressed strong views that weaknesses in these Administration factors may
manifest barriers to effective risk management.
Table 5 Summary of Administration Independent Samples T-Test
Mean

t*

Sig

Administration Factor Variables

RM

REG

Administration - Poorly communicated

5.34

5.55

-.75

.46

5.68

5.81

-.48

.63

5.88

6.48

-2.14 .04**

5.49

6.10

-1.94

strategy hinders (Strategy is defined as the
organizations vision, mission, and longterm objectives.)
Administration - Inadequate organization
structure (Organization structure includes
the design, allocation of authorities, and
responsibilities.)
Administration - Inadequate levels of top
management support of risk management
systems/practices (Support is defined to
include driving accountability and
ownership of risk management
systems/practices.)
Administration - Inadequate

.06

communication of risk issues
(Communication is defined to include
processes to identify, assess and prioritize
risks, including software/data analysis
tools used to facilitate the
communication.)
* We tested hypothesis 3 - REGs will have a higher perception than RMs that Administration factors are
barriers to effective risk management.
** Significance at the .05 level. Our testing revealed that the “Administration – Inadequate levels of top
management support of risk management systems/practices” factor was statistically significantly different (RM M =
5.88, REG M = 6.48; t = -2.14, p = .04), such that REGs more strongly viewed this Administration factor as
manifesting barriers to effective risk management systems/practices than RMs

For our H4, that both RMs and REGs will view Risk principles as favorable towards
effective risk management revealed that RMs and REGs do not differ significantly in terms of
the Risk principles (see Table 6), such that both groups expressed strong views that these Risk
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principles are important to effective risk governance and risk management. The strong beliefs of
the importance of Risk principles is consistent with the perspective that Risk principles may
serve as guidance for practitioners as they need to understand how different individuals and
groups within organizations define risk, potential biases in risk assessment, and challenges in
implementing risk management initiatives (Bromiley et al., 2014; van Asselt et al., 2011).
Table 6 Summary of Risk Principles Independent Samples T-Test
Mean

t*

Sig

Risk Principle Variables

RM

REG

Communication is key to effective risk governance and

6.32

6.18

1.04

.30

5.93

6.03

-.59

.56

6.29

6.08

1.31

.19

5.93

5.67

1.56

.12

risk management (I.e., communication exchanges
between policy makers, stakeholders, and experts.)
Inclusion is key to effective risk governance and risk
management (E.g. involving people in risk-related
decisions through which they gain ownership.)
Integration is key to effective risk governance and risk
management (I.e., synthesis of risk perceptions and
values; risk management is not usually about a single
risk, it requires risks-benefits evaluations and risk-risk
trade-offs.)

Reflection is key to effective risk governance and risk
management (I.e., risk governance cannot be routinized.
Actors must reflect on what they are doing to manage
risk and continue to emphasize that the risks are
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, as the temptation to
treat them as simple and to apply familiar routines
remains huge.)

* We tested hypothesis 4 - Both RMs and REGs will view Risk principles as favorable towards effective risk
management.

Our hypotheses, with the exception of the one Administration factor that was statistically
significantly different, while not supported, gave us more practical comfort relative to
perspectives of RMs and REGs. We tailored these hypotheses to baseline presumptions of
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perspectives that we felt RMs and REGs would have. For example, for H2, that RMs would
have a higher perception than REGs that Execution factors are barriers to effective risk
management was predicated on the possibility that as RMs live closer with RMS execution daily,
that RMs would have stronger views than REGs that Execution factors may manifest barriers to
effective risk management. Similarly, for H3, that REGs would have a higher perception than
RMs that Administration factors are barriers to effective risk management was predicated on the
view that as supervisors, with focus and concerns more relative to governance and administration
of RMS, REGs would have a higher perception than RMs that barriers to effective risk
management may manifest in the Administration phase. While one Administration factor
(Inadequate levels of top management support of RMS) proved to be statistically significantly
different, the other three Administration factors did not. Further, for H1, that both RMs and
REGs will not view Readiness factors as barriers to effective risk management was predicated on
the view that perhaps a weakness with RMS relative to our respondent groups of RMs and REGs
would stem from a greater focus by these groups on Execution and Administration phases due to
our previous views noted. With the challenges and scrutiny that RMS faces, one could take
solace with these hypotheses not being proven, which would seem to evidence alignment in RMs
and REGs perceptions that barriers to effective risk management may manifest in all the phases
of Readiness, Execution, and Administration, including the balanced perspective that Readiness
factors are not overshadowed by the latter two phases of Execution and Administration.
The study by Cho et al. (2014) identified that going through the process of creating RPs a
benefit was improved risk management and knowing the organization better, yet, most of these
institutions subject to RPs undoubtedly had some level of risk management practices prior to
DFA (McCormally et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011; Harner, 2010). Our proposed
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RGF lens enabled exploration of RMS and our respondents strongly viewed that barriers to
effective risk management can manifest in the phases of Readiness, Execution and
Administration. The respondents also strongly viewed the importance of the three risk principles
to effective risk governance and risk management. To further augment our exploration of
barriers to effective risk management, we turned to the qualitative data for additional
perspectives.
IV.2 Selected Barriers to Effective Risk Management
Table 7 displays the responses to the Likert-type question that featured nine possible
barriers to effective risk management. We obtained the mean scores to each of the nine barriers
by RM and REG and took the average of their mean scores and ranked the nine barriers.
Tekathen et al.’s (2013) study suggests accountability became an object of desire in
organizations. In line with this, the most highly ranked item selected overall was Accountability,
i.e., lack of accountability, poorly defined job roles/responsibilities, and the level of employee
involvement in risk management systems/practices (Average mean score = 6.01). Personnel, i.e.,
lack of qualified personnel to execute risk management practices (Average mean score = 5.91),
and Oversight, i.e., inadequate oversight by the board and senior leadership (Average mean score
= 5.65) ranked second and third overall respectively. The rankings of items differed by
respondent category though. That is, REGs indicated that their second ranked concern was
Oversight, (REG mean score = 6.01) versus Personnel. Further, of the nine barriers, only
Oversight’s Independent Samples T-Test indicated a significant difference in scores for RMs and
REGs (RM M = 5.29, REG M = 6.01; t = -2.90, p = .004), such that REGs more strongly viewed
inadequate oversight by the board and senior leadership as a barrier to effective risk management
systems/practices than RMs.
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Table 7 Degree to which RMs and REGs felt the following is a barrier to Effective Risk
Management
Mean Score
Rank *
1

Barrier to Effective Risk Management
Accountability:

Avg

RM

REG

6.01

5.93

6.09

5.91

5.93

5.88

5.65

5.29

6.01

5.54

5.51

5.56

5.24

5.20

5.28

5.09

5.07

5.11

5.02

4.85

5.19

4.45

4.41

4.49

4.24

4.41

4.07

Lack of accountability, poorly defined job roles/responsibilities, and
the level of employee involvement in risk management
systems/practices.
2

Personnel:
Lack of qualified personnel to execute risk management practices.

3 **

Oversight:
Inadequate oversight by the board and senior leadership.

4

Strategy:
Lack of a well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and
long-term strategy toward risk management in the organization.

5

Disparate Risk Mgmt:
Disparity of local risk management processes and enterprise level
risk management processes.

6

Documentation:
Inadequate level of documentation, i.e., lack of clearly documented
risk issues or concerns.

7

Inclusion:
Lack of lower levels of management involvement in risk
assessments.

8

Environment:
Organization challenges in accommodating socio-political
factors/pressures.

9

Auditability:
Risk management systems/practices are more focused on auditability
and documentation evidence.

Question: For each of the following statements, please indicate the degree to which you feel each is a
barrier to effective risk management. The scale is 1 to 7 where 1 means "Very Low Significance as a
Barrier" and 7 means "Very High Significance as a Barrier." Possible
* Rank is based on the average of the mean score for RM and REG.
** Of the 9 barriers, only Oversight’s Independent Samples T-Test indicated a significant difference in scores for
RMs and REGs (RM M = 5.29, REG M = 6.01; t = -2.90, p = .004), such that REGs more strongly viewed
Inadequate oversight by the board and senior leadership as a barrier to effective risk management systems/practices
than RMs.
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IV.3 Compensation Practices
Tables 8 and 9 summarizes the respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “Do
you believe that an organization’s compensation practices may manifest barriers to effective risk
management? If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,”
and “Administration,” does it manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of
these phase versus another?”
Our count and phase analysis indicates that both RMs and REGs believe compensation
practices may manifest barriers to effective risk management and generally in the Execution
phase. Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified five major categories of the types
of barriers that may manifest: misalignment to strategy (e.g., compensation practices not tied to
strategy), risk taking (e.g., compensation practices that encourages excessive risk taking),
compensation controls (e.g., lack of compensation related controls), risk culture (e.g., culture that
does not promote risk management), and risk management personnel (e.g., lack of experienced,
sufficiently compensated risk management staff).
Table 8 Compensation Practice Barriers to Effective Risk Management – Counts and
Phases (Readiness (R), Execution (E), Administration (A))
Do Compensation Practices
Manifest Barriers to
Effective Risk
Management?

Phases Barriers Manifest
In

Respondent
Type

Number of
Respondents

Yes

No

Unsure

%
Yes

R

E

A

Highest %
/ Phase

RM

32

29

3

0

91%

9

17

11

46% / E

REG

79

70

8

1

89%

8

41

16

63% / E

Question: Do you believe that an organization’s compensation practices may manifest barriers
to effective risk management? If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,”
“Execution,” and “Administration,” does it manifest barriers to effective risk management
more in one of these phase versus another? Please be as specific as possible.
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Both RMs and REGs believe compensation practices may manifest barriers to effective
risk management. RMs and REGs responded “Yes” at 91 percent and 89 percent respectively.
While both respondents indicated that compensation practices may manifest barriers in all three
phases, the highest percent cited was for the Execution phase at 46 percent and 63 percent for
RMs and REGs respectively.
Table 9 Compensation Practice Barriers to Effective Risk Management – Categories

Category

Misalignment
to Strategy

Coded Response
Performance/Comp
ensation not
aligned with
organization risk
tolerance,
objectives.
Compensation
practices not tied to
strategy.

Risk Taking

Compensation
practices
encourages
excessive risk
taking.

Lack of
compensation
related controls, i.e.
governance,
safeguards, and
escalation controls.
Compensation
Controls

Performance/Comp
ensation not
aligned with
organization risk
tolerance,
objectives.

Representative Response
Effective risk management is all
about Execution and the design and
Administration of the systems is
necessary but completely
insufficient. Employees need to be
hired and compensated for behaving
consistently with the strategy.
Currently, people do what is
inspected not what is expected.
(RM)
Yes, compensation practices can
promote ineffective decision making
which leads to taking excessive risks
(just to earn a large bonus as an
example). The barrier to effective
risk management this creates is in
the Execution phase more so than in
the Readiness or Administration
phases. (REG)
I believe that compensation
practices in the Execution phase
could manifest barriers to effective
risk management if they do not have
the proper controls. If there were
not compensating Risk Appetite
controls on growth of new accounts
for example, you could grow the
number of accounts by dropping the
credit quality scores of the
purchasers to increase the potential
pool of clients. This would result in
higher sales, but would also
potentially increase your losses
significantly. The controls along
with the proper governance and
escalation process is a key
component of risk management of
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Number of Responses / Percentage
of Total
RM
REG
Total

11 / 46%

23 / 38%

34 / 40%

3 / 13%

19 / 31%

22 / 26%

6 / 25%

11 / 18%

17 / 20%

the process. (RM)

Risk Culture

Risk
Management
Personnel

Culture that does
not promote risk
management.

Lack of
experienced,
sufficiently
compensated risk
management staff.

An organization’s compensation
practices can become barriers, but
likely on the outer edges of
compensation practices (all
variable based on revenue as an
example). Generally, this would
lead to poor Readiness and
Execution more than
Administration, as the culture would
not be one to establish strong risk
management practices (vs.
oversee/administration). (RM)
Yes. Effective Risk Mgrs have to be
experienced with stature and vision.
Banks must be willing to pay for
both to attract the right people.
(REG)

2 / 8%

5 / 8%

7 / 8%

2 / 8%

3 / 5%

5 / 6%

Question: Do you believe that an organization’s compensation practices may manifest barriers to
effective risk management? If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,”
“Execution,” and “Administration,” does it manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of
these phase versus another? Please be as specific as possible.

Misalignment to strategy - based comments were the most common among both RMs and
REGs of the types of barriers that may manifest. They indicated that misaligned organization risk
tolerance and objectives to strategy are drivers of possible barriers to effective risk management.
As one RM stated, “Effective risk management is all about Execution and the design and
Administration of the systems is necessary but completely insufficient. Employees need to be
hired and compensated for behaving consistently with the strategy. Currently, people do what is
inspected not what is expected.” This theme was echoed in spirit in the following REG
comment, noting “Whenever compensation is an incentive to a certain behavior, the behavior
must align with risk management strategies or the compensation becomes a barrier to effective
risk management.” It is not surprising that this theme emerged as the top theme for this question
as this appears consistent, more broadly, with prior studies that suggest that organizations are not
linking ERM to strategy (Viscelli, 2013).
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Risk taking - themed comments were the next most common. A higher percentage of
REGs indicated this, compared with RMs, but the overall themes were consistent, namely, that
compensation practices encourages excessive risk taking. One REG commenting on the
excessive risk taking explained, “Yes, compensation practices can promote ineffective decision
making which leads to taking excessive risks (just to earn a large bonus as an example). The
barrier to effective risk management this creates is in the Execution phase more so than in the
Readiness or Administration phases.” A RM shared a similar view about risk taking,
“Compensation practices which are not aligned to risk management practices manifest barriers
during the execution phase. The execution phase is when risk is actually taken and where risk
should be managed. Without alignment, organization may inadvertently foster a risk-taking
philosophy.”
The remaining themes reflected compensation control comments (e.g., lack of
compensation related controls, i.e. governance, safeguards, and escalation controls), risk culture
(e.g., culture that does not promote risk management), and risk management personnel (e.g., lack
of experienced, sufficiently compensated risk management staff).
IV.4 Banking Environment Provides a Type of “Insurance”
We asked respondents to share their views on the notion of “insurance” and if in banking
it manifests barriers to effective risk management. Tables 10 and 11 summarizes the
respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “Do you believe that the current unique
banking environment provides a type of “insurance” for some organizations with the concept
that “too big to fail” may indicate the organization would be “bailed out?” If so, relative to the
previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,” does this

55

notion of “insurance” manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of these
phases versus another?”
Our count and phase analysis indicates some differences in perspectives between RMs
and REGs that the notion of “insurance” may manifest barriers to effective risk management.
However, both RMs and REGs believed if barriers did manifest, it would generally be in the
Execution phase. Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified six major categories of
the types of barriers that may manifest: incentives (e.g., creates moral hazard or sense of safety
net promoting higher or excessive risk taking), risk culture (e.g., culture that does not promote
risk management), repercussions (e.g., lack of appropriate repercussion, e.g., civil, criminal
penalties, global requirements), regulatory oversight (e.g., higher cost of "insurance," i.e., higher
capital requirements result in more effective risk management), complexity (e.g., the barrier is
really "too big to manage," i.e., poor data management, reporting), and misalignment to strategy
(e.g., performance/compensation not aligned with organization risk tolerance, objectives).
Table 10 Banking Environment Provides a Type of “Insurance” Thus Creating Barriers to
Effective Risk Management – Counts and Phases (Readiness (R), Execution (E),
Administration (A), Not Specified (NS))
Does the notion of “Insurance”
Manifest Barriers to Effective
Risk Management?

Phases Barriers Manifest In

Respondent
Type

Number of
Respondents

Yes

No

Unsure

% / Yes
or No *

R

E

A

NS**

Highest % /
Phase

RM

31

9

21

1

68% / No

0

3**

0

6

100% / E

REG

81

40

38

3

49% /
Yes***

6

10

6

21

45% / E

Question: Do you believe that the current unique banking environment provides a type of “insurance” for
some organizations with the concept that “too big to fail” may indicate the organization would be “bailed
out?” If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and
“Administration,” does this notion of “insurance” manifest barriers to effective risk management more in
one of these phases versus another? Please be as specific as possible.
* Reflects the higher responses for Yes or No. REGs indicated more Yes responses to the notion of
“Insurance” manifesting barriers to effective risk management than RMs.
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** Of the 9 Yes responses, only three indicated a phase and all were Execution where barriers to
effective risk management may manifest. Respondent did not specify a phase, hence, “Not Specified”
or NS.
*** While REGs responses indicated “Yes” their “No” responses were 47 percent. This slight
difference seems to indicate questions exist on the notion of “insurance” and the “moral hazard” it
may present.

RMs and REGs perspectives that the notion of “insurance” may manifest barriers to
effective risk management differed. RMs responded “No” at 68 percent while REGs responded
“Yes” at 49 percent. Also, although REGs “Yes” responses were higher than REGs “No”
responses at 49 percent and 47 percent respectively, this slight difference would seem to indicate
questions exist for this respondent group on the notion of “insurance” and the “moral hazard” it
may present relative to impacts to effective risk management. However, while perspectives that
the notion of “insurance” may manifest barriers to effective risk management differed for RMs
and REGs, for those respondents who indicated phases where barriers may manifest, the highest
percent cited for both RMs and REGs was for the Execution phase at 100 percent and 45 percent
respectively.
Table 11 Banking Environment Provides a Type of “Insurance” Thus Creating Barriers to
Effective Risk Management – Categories
Category

Coded Response
Creates moral
hazard or sense of
safety net
promoting higher
or excessive risk
taking.

Incentives
Culture that does
not promote risk
management.

Risk Culture

Culture that does
not promote risk
management.

Representative Response
I do believe that the concept of "too big
to fail" is providing a safety net for
large organizations. "Readiness"
again would be most likely affected
because the inclination to take risk is
higher when there is a safety net.
Although SIFIs failing would cause
ripples in the economy, just about any
type of safety net has the opportunity to
be misused. In certain circumstances, I
believe the safety net might actually
incentivize misuse and risky behavior
because the organization knows it will
be "caught" by the net and protected
from sustaining fatal damage. (REG)
Not for "Readiness or Administration."
Actually those two are the most
regulated. For the key activity
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Number of Responses /
Percentage of Total
RM
REG
Total

2 / 29%

18 / 50%

20 / 47%

2 / 29%

5 / 15%

7 / 15%

"Execution" I think "too big to fail"
might be a factor in enabling a poor
risk culture. (RM)
Lack of
appropriate
repercussion, e.g.,
civil, criminal
penalties, global
requirements.
Repercussions
Individuals are
not held
accountable.

Regulatory
Oversight *

Higher cost of
"insurance," i.e.,
higher capital
requirements
result in more
effective risk
management.

Complexity

The barrier is
really "too big to
manage," i.e.,
poor data
management,
reporting.

Misalignment to
Strategy

Performance/Com
pensation not
aligned with
organization risk
tolerance,
objectives.

Clearly, large banks that were "bailed
out" were indeed taking advantage of
"insurance", however, I feel that the
common perception is that "the banks
were saved, in spite of their poor
management"; really society was saved
from the likely economic disaster that
would have occurred. That being said,
I feel that the management of the banks
and investment banks that were both
directly and indirectly responsible did
not experience appropriate
repercussions in terms of civil and
criminal penalties. (RM)
I believe that in the current
environment bank's that benefit from
"too big to fail" are paying a high price
for that "insurance" (i.e., through high
capital requirements and regulatory
demands).This has forced risk
organizations to become more active in
challenging all business decisions and
the quality of the information those
decisions are based on. If anything,
this has resulted in more effective risk
management. (RM)
It is NOT a matter of "too big to fail" it is a matter of "too big to MANAGE"!
The concept of "insurance" is less of a
barrier than the fact that the largest
banking organizations cannot manage
the more local cultures that are
ingrained, particularly when several
disparate entities are acquired over a
short period of time such that
integration was not well executed.
(REG)
Generally yes, although the post-Dodd
Frank environment, and the recent
court decision in the AIG case, creates
some uncertainty regarding the ability
or willingness of the government to step
in. I believe the failure to tie
compensation to bad risk
decisions/results is a much bigger
driver for bankers to take outsize risks.
(REG)

2 / 29%

3 / 8%

5 / 12%

1 / 13%

4 / 11%

5 / 12%

0 / 0%

3 / 8%

3 / 7%

0 / 0%

3 / 8%

3 / 7%

Question: Do you believe that the current unique banking environment provides a type of “insurance” for
some organizations with the concept that “too big to fail” may indicate the organization would be “bailed
out?” If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,”
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does this notion of “insurance” manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of these phases
versus another? Please be as specific as possible.
* Interestingly, some respondents indicated the current environment benefits from "too big to fail" as organizations
are paying a high price for that "insurance" and believe that this has resulted in more effective risk management.

Incentives - based comments were the most common overall for RMs and REGs of the
types of barriers that may manifest. They indicated that the sense of a “safety net” promoted
higher or excessive risk taking. As one REG stated, “I do believe that the concept of "too big to
fail" is providing a safety net for large organizations. "Readiness" again would be most likely
affected because the inclination to take risk is higher when there is a safety net. Although SIFIs
failing would cause ripples in the economy, just about any type of safety net has the opportunity
to be misused. In certain circumstances, I believe the safety net might actually incentivize
misuse and risky behavior because the organization knows it will be "caught" by the net and
protected from sustaining fatal damage.” One RM stated, “Yes. Execution. The concept of "too
big to fail" wasn't introduced until there was a need. Now the term is widely accepted and is no
doubt being used to leverage risk taking in extremely large organizations, but this is an opinion
as I have no supporting evidence to back it up. Should we end up in another bail out situation,
expect applicability of the term and conditions to resurface.”
Risk culture - themed comments were next most common. They indicated “too big to
fail" might be a factor in enabling a poor risk culture. One RM stated, “Not for "Readiness or
Administration." Actually those two are the most regulated. For the key activity "Execution" I
think "too big to fail" might be a factor in enabling a poor risk culture.” One REG stated, “I
would think this would be a factor in the readiness phase. Too big to fail is more problematic at
the top of the house in developing sound strategic plans that adequately incorporate sound risk
management - and setting the culture for risk management from the top.” The risk culture theme
is consistent with Andersen et al. (2012) who appeared to find that poor risk management
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practices could be linked to an unhealthy organizational culture which played a significant role in
the failure to implement sound risk management practices.
For some RMs and REGs regulatory oversight themed comments were provided and
interestingly, these themes indicated a perceived benefit to effective risk management arising
from the notion of “insurance” and “too big to fail.” Some respondents indicated the current
environment benefits from "too big to fail" as organizations are paying a high price for that
"insurance" and believe that this has resulted in more effective risk management. As one RM
stated, “I believe that in the current environment bank's that benefit from "too big to fail" are
paying a high price for that "insurance" (i.e., through high capital requirements and regulatory
demands).This has forced risk organizations to become more active in challenging all business
decisions and the quality of the information those decisions are based on. If anything, this has
resulted in more effective risk management.” One REG shared the essence of this perspective
with the following, “Yes. The "Big Banks" had an advantage of too big to fail. With what
Federal Reserve Board has proposed, increased capital requirement for large banks will reduce
the advantage.”
The remaining themes reflected repercussions (e.g., lack of appropriate repercussion, e.g.,
civil, criminal penalties, global requirements), complexity (e.g., the barrier is really "too big to
manage," i.e., poor data management, reporting), and misalignment to strategy (e.g.,
performance/compensation not aligned with organization risk tolerance, objectives).
IV.5 RMS Phases and Percent Complete
We asked respondents through a two part question to share their views on the RMS phase
factors of Readiness, Execution, and Administration and “how complete” must the phase factors
be for risk management systems/practices to be effective. The first part sought perspectives of
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either “100 percent complete” or “<100 percent complete.” The second was an open-ended
question seeking any additional perspectives to the percentage complete portion of the question.
Tables 12, 13, and 14 summarizes the respondents’ responses to the question: “Relative to the
previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration” factors, for
risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please select the answer that
best reflects your personal views: 1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration
factors must be complete and in place for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.”
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not
have to be 100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” Please
provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question above.”
Our count analysis indicates both RMs and REGs share the perspective of “<100 percent
complete;” RMs and REGs indicated 80 percent and 74 percent respectively with this view. Our
coding and subsequent content analysis for respondents who offered perspectives for “100
percent complete” identified four categories of perspectives for their choice of the percentage
complete portion of the question: dynamic risk management (e.g., risk systems/practices should
be dynamic and evolve with environment), key risk controls (e.g., include yearly simulations and
trials), interconnectivity, and risk culture (e.g., risk systems/practices specifications should be
implemented completely).
Our coding and subsequent content analysis for respondents who offered perspectives for
“<100 percent complete” identified eight categories of perspectives for their choice of the
percentage complete portion of the question: dynamic risk management (e.g., risk
systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), risk management maturity level (e.g.,
experienced risk managers can offset risk systems/practices that are not 100% complete), risk
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culture (e.g., risk culture should enable risk systems/practices to be effective), key risk controls
(e.g., risk systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), qualitative challenges (e.g., risk
systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), level of investment (e.g., risk
systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), accountability (e.g., risk systems/practices
should be complemented by accountability), and issue awareness (e.g., risk systems/practices
should be dynamic and evolve with environment).
Table 12 Must all phases of Readiness (R), Execution (E), Administration (A) factors be
complete for Risk Management Systems/Practices (RMS) to be Effective or may the R,E,A
factors be in place but be < 100% complete and still be Effective – Counts
For RMS to be
Effective
Respondent
Type

Number of
Respondents

100%
Complete

<100%
Complete

Highest % /
100% or
<100%

RM

41

8

33

80% / <100%

REG

96

25

71

74% / <100%

Question: Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and
“Administration” factors, for risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please
select the answer that best reflects your personal views:
1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be complete and in place for
risk management systems/practices to be “effective.”
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to
be 100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.”
Please provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question
above. Please be as specific as possible.

For RMS to be effective, both RMs and REGs indicated that all phases of Readiness,
Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to be 100% complete,
for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” RMs and REGs responded “<100
percent complete” at 80 percent and 74 percent respectively.
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Table 13 RMs and REGs who offered Perspectives with their choice of 100% Complete –
Categories
Category

Dynamic Risk
Management

Coded Response
Risk systems/practices
should be dynamic and
evolve with
environment.
Risk systems/practices
specifications should
be implemented
completely.

Key Risk Controls

Include yearly
simulations and trials.

Interconnectivity

Risk systems/practices
specifications should
be implemented
completely.

Risk Culture

Risk systems/practices
specifications should
be implemented
completely.

Representative Response

Number of Responses /
Percentage of Total
RMs
REGs
Total

Target state goal should be 100
percent with the bar constantly
being raised in the future. (RM)

2 / 100%

0 / 0%

2 / 33%

Must be 100% completed with
yearly simulation and table top
trials.(REG)

0 / 0%

2 / 50%

2 / 33%

0 / 0%

1 / 25%

1 / 17%

0 / 0%

1 / 25%

1 / 17%

Weaknesses in certain aspects
of risk management will hinder
performance in other processes
(REG)
An effective risk management
framework must be complete in
order to create and instill a
positive culture. Leaving a
framework incomplete sends
the message that risk
management is not a priority.
(REG)

Question: Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and
“Administration” factors, for risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please
select the answer that best reflects your personal views:
1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be complete and in place for
risk management systems/practices to be “effective.”
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to
be 100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.”
Please provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question
above. Please be as specific as possible.

Most respondents did not provide additional perspectives on their selection for the first
part of this question regarding their choice of “100 percent complete.” Further, while our coding
and content analysis for respondents who offered perspectives did identify categories, there were
no common categories between RMs and REGs. For RMs, the most common category was
dynamic risk management and for REGs, the most common category was key risk controls.
Relative to dynamic risk management, one RM offered this perspective for their selection of
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“100 percent complete,” “While there's degrees to each of the factors of risk management, all
three need to be working in concert for risk management to be effective across categories of
risk.” For key risk controls, one REG stated, “In short, you don't know what you don't know. In
order to be confident that risk management systems are operating effectively, they need to be
fully implemented, executed, and tested for effectiveness and sustainability.” The two remaining
categories of interconnectivity, and risk culture were common for REGs but not for RMs. For
interconnectivity, one REG offered this perspective for their selection of “100 percent complete,”
“Weaknesses in certain aspects of risk management will hinder performance in other processes.”
Relative to risk culture, one REG stated, “An effective risk management framework must be
complete in order to create and instill a positive culture. Leaving a framework incomplete sends
the message that risk management is not a priority.”
Table 14 RMs and REGs who offered Perspectives with their choice of <100% Complete –
Categories
Category

Dynamic Risk
Management

Risk
Management
Maturity Level

Coded Response
Risk systems/practices
should be dynamic and
evolve with
environment.
Risk systems/practices
can have gaps but still
be effective.
Risk systems/practices
should be dynamic and
evolve with
environment.

Experienced risk
managers can offset
risk systems/practices
that are not 100%
complete.

Representative Response

Number of Responses /
Percentage of Total
RMs
REGs
Total

Risk management is an
evolving process. What works
today, may not work tomorrow.
You can have systems that are
effective but there is always
room for improvement. (REG)

6 / 43%

15 / 45%

21 / 45%

Effective Risk management is
about the ability to identify,
quantify and report the risk, not
all of which will be immediately
possible when the risk is
initially discovered. All of the
phases should be able to move
to 100% complete, but
"effective" management
includes the ability to provide
early warning signs of
emerging themes and issues.
(RM)

3 / 21%

8 / 24%

11 / 23%
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Risk culture should
enable risk
systems/practices to be
effective.

Risk Culture
Risk systems/practices
can have gaps but still
be effective.

Key Risk
Controls

Risk systems/practices
can have gaps but still
be effective.

Qualitative
challenges

Risk systems/practices
can have gaps but still
be effective.

If Readiness and Execution
have been met, the risk
management culture should
take hold and allow the
processes to be effective. Then
Administration aspects may be
completed over time to fully
implement the system. Risk
management is more than the
sum of the processes or the
system used to manage risk; it
must be socialized and
operationalized. The
administration of the system
should be just a formality at
that point. (REG)
It's more about balance and
focus on the key governance
control that all good firms have
which is absolute clarity
regarding "kill, feed, starve"
decisioning relative to the
operation. Well defined "kill
power" user manifests in stable
and steady operating results.
(REG)
Given the dynamic economic
environment, I think it will be a
big challenge to ever hit 100%.
I think the key themes structure, staff and
transparency must be in place,
but 100% may not be
achievable. The risk is
everything becomes so focused
on documentation that
decisions can't be made in a
timely manner. It becomes
document management, not risk
management. Granted there is
a balance, but I think 100% is
not realistic. Furthermore, it is
a qualitative assessment
making it hard to drive
consistency, etc. of what 100%
means. (RM)
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4 / 29%

5 / 16%

9 / 19%

0 / 0%

2 / 6%

2 / 5%

1 / 7%

0 / 0%

1 / 2%

Level of
investment

Risk systems/practices
can have gaps but still
be effective.

Accountability

Risk systems/practices
should be
complemented by
accountability.

Issue
Awareness

Risk systems/practices
should be dynamic and
evolve with
environment.

The question does not focus on
the concept of "most effective";
to reach that level of
effectiveness (maximum level of
effectiveness of the risk
management processes does
require that the three factors all
be 100% complete or working
within the firm. Basically, less
than 100% implementation of
all three factors will lead to a
level of effectiveness that is less
than maximum effectiveness,
but most likely is at a
reasonably good level of
effectiveness, all things
considered. I keep thinking
that the answer is you get what
you pay for -- meaning if the
three factors are 100%
implemented the likelihood that
the level of risk management
effectiveness is very high or at
an upper level is good; on the
reverse end, if the three factors
are implemented at say a 23%
level, the overall level of risk
management effectiveness will
be much lower, BUT STILL
BETTER THAN IT WOULD BE
IF THE THREE FACTORS
WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED
AT ALL. So risk management
is on a sliding scale, you get
more out of it the more you put
into it across the level of
implementation of the three
factors, Readiness, Execution,
and Administration. (REG)
Accountability for risk takers
(call it 'culture' if you must) is
the key to risk management.
You can have all the systems
and/or processes in the world,
plus a highly experienced /
motivated risk management
team, but it matters not when
the body creating risk is not
held accountable. (REG)
Awareness of the issues and a
well designed and progressing
plan for improving RM
practices is often enough to
manage a firm well. (REG)
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0 / 0%

1 / 3%

1 / 2%

0 / 0%

1 / 3%

1 / 2%

0 / 0%

1 / 3%

1 / 2%

Question: Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and
“Administration” factors, for risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please
select the answer that best reflects your personal views:
1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be complete and in place for
risk management systems/practices to be “effective.”
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to
be 100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.”
Please provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question
above. Please be as specific as possible.

More respondents provided additional perspectives on their selection for the first part of
this question regarding their choice of “<100 percent complete.” Dynamic risk managementbased comments were the most common among both RMs and REGs. Unlike for “100 percent
complete” where our coding and subsequent content analysis did not identify dynamic risk
management as a category for REGs, this category was the most common among both RMs and
REGs for “<100 percent complete.” One REG stated, “Given that risk management practices are
still evolving, waiting until all components are in place and functioning is worse than having a
phased approach to risk management processes.” As echoed by one RM, “My belief is that you
have to do as much as you can, as soon as you can in regards to identifying and mitigating risks.
You cannot wait until all phases are perfect and all systems are "Go", the process must be
iterative and malleable.”
Risk management maturity level - themed comments were the next most common. They
indicated that experienced risk managers may offset risk systems/practices that are not 100%
complete. One RM stated, “Effective Risk management is about the ability to identify, quantify
and report the risk, not all of which will be immediately possible when the risk is initially
discovered. All of the phases should be able to move to 100% complete, but "effective"
management includes the ability to provide early warning signs of emerging themes and issues.”
Similarly, one REG stated, “In any organization, there may be gaps or identified weaknesses that
exist, but may be offset by key strengths to maintain an effective risk management structure.
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The key factor is the existence of an experienced and skilled management structure that knows
its strategic objectives, establishes an effective governance structure, and effectively
communicates to all levels of the organization that can be easily understood and followed.”
Risk culture - themed comments were the third most common. They indicated that risk
systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective with a strong risk culture. One REG
offered, “If Readiness and Execution have been met, the risk management culture should take
hold and allow the processes to be effective. Then Administration aspects may be completed
over time to fully implement the system. Risk management is more than the sum of the
processes or the system used to manage risk; it must be socialized and operationalized. The
administration of the system should be just a formality at that point.” One RM shared a similar
cultural perspective stating, “I believe you could still have some small gaps in the process but
still have an effective system in place. Self ID audit issues should be encouraged to document the
gaps and remediate the issues while the gaps are small.” For RMs, however, this themed
comment ranked second and risk management maturity level ranked third.
Similar to “100 percent complete,” our coding and content analysis for respondents who
offered perspectives for their choice of “<100 percent complete,” identified some categories that
were not common between RMs and REGs. These remaining themes reflected key risk controls
(e.g., risk systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), qualitative challenges (e.g.,
qualitatively challenges can make executing risk systems/practices difficult and inconsistent),
level of investment (e.g., risk systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective),
accountability (e.g., risk systems/practices should be complemented by accountability), and issue
awareness (e.g., risk systems/practices should be dynamic and evolve with environment).
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IV.6 State of the Financial/Economic Environment
We asked respondents to share their views on the importance of the state of the
financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk
management and if it may manifest barriers to effective risk management. Tables 15 and 16
summarizes the respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “How important is the state
of the financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk
management? (i.e., if we are coming out of a financial crisis then general perceptions of risk
management may be different than if there is a long period of stability.) and Relative to the
previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,” do you believe
that the state of the financial/economic environment may manifest barriers to effective risk
management? (E.g., in periods of long stability, management may begin to focus less on
Execution factors thus creating potential barriers to effective risk management.)”
Our count and phase analysis indicates that both RMs and REGs believe the state of the
financial/economic environment is important in shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness
of risk management and these perceptions may generate barriers to effective risk management
generally in the Execution phase.

Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified six

major categories of the types of barriers that may manifest: risk focus (e.g., periods of stability
reduces the focus on or priority of risk management), risk taking & complacency (e.g., periods of
stability promotes more risk taking and complacency), sustainability (e.g., it can cause risk
management to be backward instead of forward looking), perceptions (e.g., strong risk culture
and risk management is not sustained during perceived periods of stability), regulatory oversight
(e.g., it has increased the levels of regulatory oversight including risk management), and
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complexity & interconnectedness (e.g., complexity and interconnectedness of financial/economic
environment creates barriers to effective risk management).
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Table 15 How Important is the State of the financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the Effectiveness
of Risk Management and do you believe that these perceptions may manifest Barriers to Effective Risk Management – Counts
and Phases (Readiness (R), Execution (E), Administration (A), Not Specified (NS))
Level of Importance in State of financial/economic
environment shaping perceptions of the Effectiveness
of Risk Management.

Phases Barriers Manifest In

Respondent
Type

Number of
Respondents

High

Moderate

Low

Not
Important

% / Level of
Importance*

R

E

A

NS

Highest %
/ Phase

RM

31

21

8

1

1

68% / H

4

24

15

3

56% / E

REG

78

54

16

3

5

69% / H

9

60

38

5

56% / E

Question: How important is the state of the financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk management?
(i.e., if we are coming out of a financial crisis then general perceptions of risk management may be different than if there is a long period of stability.).
Please be as specific as possible.
* Reflects the percentage of the most frequent level of importance. Both RMs and REGs viewed the state of the financial/economic as highly
important to shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk management.

Both RMs and REGs believe the state of the financial/economic environment is important in shaping general perceptions of the
effectiveness of risk management. RMs and REGs indicated a high level of importance at 68 percent and 69 percent respectively.
While both respondents indicated that the state of the financial/economic environment may manifest barriers in all three phases, the
highest percent cited was for the Execution phase with both RMs and REGs at 56 percent.
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Table 16 State of the financial/economic environment shapes general perceptions of the
Effectiveness of Risk Management may Manifest Barriers to Effective Risk Management –
Categories

Category

Risk Focus

Risk Taking &
Complacency

Sustainability

Coded Response
Periods of stability
reduces the focus on or
priority of risk
management.
Strong risk culture and
risk management is not
sustained during
perceived periods of
stability.
It can cause risk
management to be
backward instead of
forward looking.
Periods of stability
reduces the focus on or
priority of risk
management.
Periods of stability
promotes more risk
taking and
complacency.
Strong risk culture and
risk management is not
sustained during
perceived periods of
stability.
It can cause risk
management to be
backward instead of
forward looking.

Perceptions

Regulatory
Oversight *

State of the economy
can promote incorrect
perceptions of the level
of risk in the
environment and the
quality of risk
management.
Strong risk culture and
risk management is not
sustained during
perceived periods of
stability.
It has increased the
levels of regulatory
oversight including risk
management.

Representative Response

Higher capital levels are
mitigating risk, but too much
focus on new regulation and the
prior problems continues to
reduce the focus on the next set
of problems. Ill prepared to
identify at this point. (REG)

Number of Responses /
Percentage of Total
RMs
REGs
Total

12 / 40%

29 / 40%

41 / 39%

7 / 23%

21 / 28%

28 / 27%

6 / 20%

12 / 16%

18 / 17%

I believe it could, but the
implementation of compensating
capital controls, risk appetites
and management reporting and
escalation that is an effective
risk management system
provides a more stable
environment regardless of the
state of the economy. (RM)

2 / 7%

10 / 13%

12 / 12%

Yes, due to the compression of
bank's earnings they will only
implement the risk management
they are forced to by regulators.

2 / 7%

2 / 3%

4 / 4%

The longer the time since the last
crisis, the higher the probability
that resources will be shifted to
other priorities. The
redeployment of resources will
impact execution first, but will
ultimately impact all phases.
(RM)
Bank's fundamentals should not
change as a result of economic
environment. During good times
and bad times bank's approach
to risk should not change. Good
times do not last. It is an
economic cycle. Bank's risk
appetite and how it carries out
its risk tolerances determines its
own fate. (REG)
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(REG)

Complexity &
Interconnected
ness

Complexity and
interconnectedness of
financial/economic
environment creates
barriers to effective risk
management.

The main features of the
financial/economist environment
that creates barrier to effective
risk management are the
complexity and interconnectivity
of financial and economic
institutions. (RM)

1 / 3%

0 / 0%

1 / 1%

Question: Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and
“Administration,” do you believe that the state of the financial/economic environment may manifest
barriers to effective risk management? (E.g., in periods of long stability, management may begin to focus
less on Execution factors thus creating potential barriers to effective risk management.) Please be as
specific as possible.
* Interestingly, some respondents indicated the Regulatory Oversight can manifest barriers to effective risk
management by “driving the focus of risk management” or that there is a “lag between financial entrepreneurialism
and regulation.”

Risk focus - based comments were the most common among both RMs and REGs of the
types of barriers that may manifest. They indicated that periods of stability can reduce risk focus
and that strong risk management should be maintained in up and down financial/economic
cycles. One REG stated, “Yes, in periods of long stability, management may begin focusing on
revenue priorities and may cut funding to risk remediation activities thereby creating a barrier to
effective risk management.” This theme was echoed in spirit in the following RM comment,
noting “Interest on the maintenance of effective risk management practices will continue to
decline, now that a period of improvement and the beginnings of a more stable environment is on
the horizon, so this will become a barrier to effective risk management.”
Risk taking & complacency - themed comments were the next most common. A slightly
higher percentage of REGs indicated this, compared with RMs, but the overall themes were
consistent, namely, that periods of stability may promote more risk taking and complacency.
One RM commented, “Yes, executives, business unit managers, and risk managers can become
lax in their diligence and, I feel, can lose the focus on the independence of their role. Risk
inventories may not be reviewed as thoroughly, and relationships between business unit and risk
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executives may become such that the required institutionalised friction between roles may be
lessened. "Times are good, do we really need to do a ground-up inventory of our business unit
risks?”” A REG shared a similar view, “I do believe the financial/economic environment may
manifest barriers. All phases may be affected in long periods of stability, creating more
incentive for risk, less emphasis on renewing and revising risk management practices over time,
and lax implementation of existing risk management practices.” The risk focus and risk taking &
complacency themes are in line with Huber et al. (2013a) who suggest that conservatism can
reinforce existing understanding and practices.
Sustainability - themed comments were the third most common. They indicated that
strong risk systems/practices should be sustained regardless of the state of the financial/economic
environment. One REG offered, “Bank's fundamentals should not change as a result of
economic environment. During good times and bad times bank's approach to risk should not
change. Good times do not last. It is an economic cycle. Bank's risk appetite and how it carries
out its risk tolerances determines its own fate.” One RM shared a similar perspective stating, “If
proper controls and documentation are in place, theoretically, the external environment would
not hinder REA. Separating risk reporting lines from finance to ensure independence is also
important.”
For some RMs and REGs regulatory oversight themed comments were provided and
interestingly, indicated that they may manifest barriers to effective risk management. This is due
to regulatory oversight “driving the focus of risk management” or that there is a “lag between
financial entrepreneurialism and needed regulation.” One REG stated, “Yes, due to the
compression of bank's earnings they will only implement the risk management they are forced to
by regulators.” One RM shared the essence of this perspective with the following, “It doesn't act
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as a barrier necessarily, but can act as a catalyst when regulations and oversight are adjusted to
promote sustained economic growth.”
The remaining themes reflected perception comments (e.g., state of the economy can
promote incorrect perceptions of the level of risk in the environment and the quality of risk
management), and complexity & interconnectedness (e.g., complexity and interconnectedness of
financial/economic environment creates barriers to effective risk management).
IV.7 Categories of Barriers to Effective Risk Management By RMS Phase
The hypotheses tests for the three phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration
clearly indicate both RMs and REGs view that weaknesses in these phases’ factors may manifest
barriers to effective risk management. We augment the perspectives toward these phases by
capturing the types of barriers to effective risk management that may result as identified from
three of the open-ended questions presented earlier where we sought the respondent groups’
perspectives on phases that may manifest barriers. Table 17 lists the previously discussed
category of barriers by phase as determined by our content analysis for the questions pertaining
to compensation practices, the banking environment providing a type of “insurance,” and the
state of financial/economic environment.
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Table 17 Categories of Barriers to Effective Risk Management By Phase of Readiness,
Execution, and Administration from the Three open-ended questions pertaining to
Compensation Practices, Banking Environment Provides a Type of “Insurance,” and State
of the Financial/Economic Environment

Phase

Compensation Practices*
 Misalignment to Strategy
(RM, REG)

Readiness

 Risk Culture (RM, REG)

Banking Environment
Provide a Type of
“Insurance” *

 Incentives (REG)
 Risk Culture (REG)

 Risk Taking (RM, REG)

State of
Financial/Economic
Environment*
 Perceptions (REG)
 Risk Focus (RM, REG)
 Risk Taking &
Complacency (REG)
 Sustainability (REG)

 Compensation Controls
(RM, REG)
 Misalignment to Strategy
(RM, REG)
Execution

 Risk Culture (RM, REG)
 Risk Management
Personnel (REG)
 Risk Taking (RM, REG)

 Complexity (REG)
 Incentives (RM, REG)

 Regulatory Oversight (RM,
REG) ***

 Misalignment to Strategy
(REG)

 Risk Focus (RM, REG)

 Regulatory Oversight
(REG) **
 Risk Culture (RM, REG)

Administration

 Risk Culture (REG)
 Risk Management
Personnel (REG)

 Risk Taking &
Complacency (RM, REG)
 Sustainability (RM, REG)
 Complexity &
Interconnectedness (RM)

 Compensation Controls
(RM, REG)
 Misalignment to Strategy
(RM, REG)

 Perceptions (RM, REG)

 Incentives (REG)

 Regulatory Oversight
(REG) ***

 Risk Culture (REG)

 Risk Focus (RM, REG)

 Repercussions (REG)

 Risk Taking &
Complacency (RM, REG)

 Risk Taking (RM, REG)

 Sustainability (RM, REG)

* We include in parenthesis beside each barrier category the respondent group who indicated this phase
based upon our content analysis.
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** Some respondents indicated the current environment benefits from "too big to fail" as
organizations are paying a high price for that "insurance" and believe that this has
resulted in more effective risk management.
*** Some respondents indicated the Regulatory Oversight can manifest barriers to
effective risk management by “driving the focus of risk management” or that there is a
“lag between financial entrepreneurialism and regulation.”

Some categories overlap phases and this is because the nuances of categories appear to
have aspects that may result in alignment with different phases depending on the lens through
which it is being viewed. As one RM states, “I believe that compensation practices in the
execution phase could manifest barriers to effective risk management if they do not have the
proper controls. If there were not compensating Risk Appetite controls on growth of new
accounts for example, you could grow the number of accounts by dropping the credit quality
scores of the purchasers to increase the potential pool of clients. This would result in higher
sales, but would also potentially increase your losses significantly. The controls along with the
proper governance and escalation process are a key component of risk management of the
process.” Whereas one REG stated, “An organization's compensation structure may be designed
in a manner to introduce misconduct risk in an otherwise perceived effective risk management
framework. This would be evident in the Administration phase, where well-written policies and
adequate reporting exists.”
The table presents a more explicit view relative to phases and not surprisingly aligns with
the earlier detailed analysis. For the notion of “insurance,” RMs largely indicated “No”
regarding its impact to manifesting barriers, hence, most of the categories noted are mainly cited
by REGs. Similarly, it is easier to see why regulatory oversight seemingly contradicts itself as a
benefit to effective risk management for the notion of “insurance,” i.e., organizations paying a
higher price for “too big to fail” and has forced organizations to scrutinize their business
decisions, and as a barrier to effective risk management for the state of the financial/economic
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environment, i.e., regulation my drive risk focus or may be the root cause of lags between
financial entrepreneurialism and supervision.
IV.8 Barriers to Effective Risk Management Leading up to the Financial Crisis of 20072009
We asked respondents to share their perspectives on barriers to effective risk
management leading up to the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Table 18 summarizes the
respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “Benefits cited by bankers and regulators
that were preparing Resolution Plans included improved understanding of the bank and
improved risk management. However, risk management practices were in place prior to the
requirement for Resolution Plans. What do you believe were barriers to effective risk
management at firms leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009?”
Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified 13 major categories of the types of
barriers to effective risk management at firms leading up to the financial crisis of 2007– 2009:
risk culture (e.g., lack of a risk culture and accountability), underestimating risk (e.g., under
estimating risk, including the nature of it; type of risk; and its level of possible systemic impact ),
siloed risk management (e.g., siloed risk management processes and inadequate resources ),
corporate greed (e.g., revenue incentives driving transaction decisions), risk focus (e.g., periods
of stability/complacency reduces the focus on or priority of risk management), complexity &
interconnectedness (e.g., complexity and interconnectedness of financial/economic environment
creates barriers to effective risk management), overconfidence (e.g., overconfidence in existing
risk management processes), regulatory oversight (e.g., weak regulatory oversight),
misalignment to strategy (e.g., performance/compensation not aligned with organization risk
tolerance, objectives), repercussions (e.g., lack of appropriate repercussion, e.g., civil, criminal
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penalties, global requirements), standardized risk management (e.g., risk management practices
that were too standardized and lacked adaptability), independent oversight (e.g., lack of
independent risk assessments/oversight), and qualitative challenges (e.g., firms lacked the
qualitative perspective to properly and consistently execute risk management).
Table 18 Barriers to Effective Risk Management leading up to the Financial Crisis of 2007
through 2009 – Categories
Category

Risk Culture

Coded Response
Lack of a risk
culture and
accountability.

Risk Management
practices that were
too standardized
and lacked
adaptability.

Under estimating
risk, including the
nature of it; type of
risk; and its level
of possible
systemic impact.
Underestimating
Risk

Siloed Risk
Management

Firms lacked the
qualitative
perspective to
properly and
consistently
execute risk
management.

Siloed risk
management
processes and
inadequate
resources.

Representative Response
Lack of need for effective risk
management - it is not embedded
cultural in most organisations,
and certainly not within
organisations that have a strong
focus on Investment banking, so
are more prone to risk taking.
Historically, I have not found
effective risk management
practices and culture to be
embedded appropriately within
these types of banks and financial
services, so it is not surprising
that ineffective practices were in
place prior to the regulators
mandates for RRP requirements.
(RM)
There was insufficient emphasis
on risk management, as well as
no clear definition. Inconsistency
was a large barrier. And, outside
of credit risk management,
regulators were not emphasizing
it or gauging it as a "system" or
"culture" (although there were
measurements and regulatory
guidance in place). / In addition,
many risks inherent in the
financial sector are not easily
quantified, such as compliance
and reputation risks. . (REG)
Lack of integration from an
enterprise level down to a LOB
unit level. Lack of a
multidisciplinary view of risks
(credit vs. tech vs. operational vs.
fraud vs. vendors vs. market vs.
business continuity, etc.) caused
each to managed within a silo.
Focus on safety/soundness vs.
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Number of Responses /
Percentage of Total
RMs
REGs
Total

6 / 21%

15 / 21%

21 / 21%

6 / 21%

8 / 11%

14 / 14%

3 / 11%

11 / 15%

14 / 13%

Corporate greed.

Corporate Greed

Lack of a risk
culture and
accountability.

Risk Focus

Periods of
stability/complacen
cy reduces the
focus on or priority
of risk
management.

Complexity &
Interconnectedness

Complexity and
interconnectedness
of
financial/economic
environment
creates barriers to
effective risk
management.

Overconfidence

Overconfidence in
existing risk
management
processes.

consumer protection. / / There
was also a lack of accountability.
The gov't would fine or issue a
MRA, but until they took control
of capital reallocation it was less
of an area of focus for
CEO/Board level executives.
(RM)
I believe the barriers included
complacency (e.g., prosperity,
what bubble?), lack of
accountability (e.g., "too big to
fail" so called insurance policy)
and too much greed (e.g., revenue
based incentives primarily driving
all financial transaction
decisions, including those
decisions made by Rating
agencies. Risk management was
not part of the compensation
equation.) (REG)
Complacency. As long as the
business was thriving and
regulators weren't knocking on
the door, management was more
apt to assume risk exceeding its
stated risk appetite. (RM)
Certainly the complicated legal
structures of firms contributed to
poor understanding of aggregate
risk in the firm. Poor/disjointed
systems and poor data
contributed to the ability to
identify and quantify key risks,
both at business line level and at
the enterprise level. Complex
financial products (including
legal/contractual obligations)
were not well understood by
decision maker. But we need to
keep in mind that the
unprecedented national collapse
of the housing market, the black
swan/100 year event drove a lot
of the crisis. I doubt even the best
risk managed shops could have
prepared for something that was
considered inconceivable by
virtually all market participants
in 2005. (REG)
Prior to the financial crisis, I
believe the management of many
large institutions held a
"misguided level of confidence"
regarding the effectiveness of
their risk management practices.
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0 / 0%

11 / 15%

11 / 11%

4 / 13%

5 / 7%

9 / 9%

3 / 11%

3 / 4%

6 / 6%

2 / 7%

4 / 5%

6 / 6%

Regulatory
Oversight

Weak regulatory
oversight.

Misalignment to
Strategy

Performance/Comp
ensation not
aligned with
organization risk
tolerance,
objectives.
Corporate greed.

Repercussions

Lack of appropriate
repercussion, e.g.,
civil, criminal
penalties, global
requirements.

Standardized Risk
Management

Independent
Oversight

Qualitative
Challenges

Risk Management
practices that were
too standardized
and lacked
adaptability.
Lack of
independent risk
assessments/oversi
ght.

Firms lacked the
qualitative
perspective to
properly and
consistently
execute risk
management.

Since the crisis, many institutions
experienced large losses and
many lessons have been learned.
There now exists a different
mindset about risk management.
Many large institutions have
enhanced their risk management
practices and have hired
experienced professionals and
staff for these functions. (RM)
Lack of government oversight and
policies were to relax in favor of
financial institutions. (REG)
Shareholder demands for
increased share value conflict
with sound risk management
practices, which tend to limit
share value growth. (REG)
I feel that incentives offers to
processors, executives, and
salespeople were greater than the
perceived repercussions of their
actions. Plus, "everyone else was
doing it". (RM)
The major barriers were reliance
on past paradigms and an
inherent bias of the manner in
which types of risks would
manifest themselves. (REG)
Execution and independent
assessment (oversight) needs to
be in place for each organization
(RM)
This assumption is incorrect.
Firms did not have good risk
management practices. If that was
the case the key risk indicators
would have driven management
to make good decisions early and
prevent the collapse of
institutions (e.g. banks did not
have adequate liquidity.) Firms
had in place quantitative risk
controls, but not qualitative
actions plans to execute.
Furthermore, they didn't even
know what hit them. (REG)

1 / 3%

5 / 7%

6 / 6%

0 / 0%

6 / 8%

6 / 6%

2 / 7%

2 / 3%

4 / 4%

1 / 3%

2 / 3%

3 / 3%

1 / 3%

0 / 0%

1 / 1%

0 / 0%

1 / 1%

1 / 1%

Question: Benefits cited by bankers and regulators that were preparing Resolution Plans included improved
understanding of the bank and improved risk management. However, risk management practices were in
place prior to the requirement for Resolution Plans. What do you believe were barriers to effective risk
management at firms leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009? Please be as specific as possible.
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Organizational culture was found to be a major deterrent to risk management as risk
management practices were discouraged and resistance to change was constant (Kleffner et al.,
2003). Consistent with this, risk culture - based comments were the most common overall
among RMs and REGs of the types of barriers to effective risk management at firms leading up
to the financial crisis of 2007– 2009. They indicated that risk culture and accountability were
missing in most organizations. One RM stated, “Lack of need for effective risk management - it
is not embedded cultural in most organisations, and certainly not within organisations that have a
strong focus on Investment banking, so are more prone to risk taking. Historically, I have not
found effective risk management practices and culture to be embedded appropriately within these
types of banks and financial services, so it is not surprising that ineffective practices were in
place prior to the regulators mandates for RRP requirements.” One REG stated, “Herd mentality
and the need to stay in the game. If you are in the business of banking, as the competitive
pressures move to weaker risk management principles, institutions need to decide where their
breaking point is and get out. The consequences of pulling back require the willingness to
sacrifice returns and prepare to ride out the storm.”
Underestimating risk and siloed risk management - themed comments tied for the next
most common. A higher number of RMs responses aligned to underestimating risk whereas for
REGs, it was siloed risk management, but the overall number of responses for both was equal.
For underestimating risk, one RM commented, “The greatest barrier may have been a lack of
imagination - I think the severity of the financial crisis game as a genuine shock and really
challenged peoples assumptions about the soundness of their institutions. Also, risk management
functions are much better resourced now than they were in 2007 so there were significant
barriers arising from a lack of trained staff.” A REG shared a similar view, “Underestimation of
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"worst case" scenarios. People who quantified risk underestimated the downside. Management
doesn't understand models and relied too heavily on models…The failure to understand that
actions that benefit the individual firm in the short run could make the situation worse for the
industry.”
For siloed risk management, one RM stated, “Lack of integration from an enterprise level
down to a LOB unit level. Lack of a multidisciplinary view of risks (credit vs. tech vs.
operational vs. fraud vs. vendors vs. market vs. business continuity, etc.) caused each to managed
within a silo. Focus on safety/soundness vs. consumer protection. There was also a lack of
accountability. The Gov’t would fine or issue a MRA, but until they took control of capital
reallocation it was less of an area of focus for CEO/Board level executives.” Similar to this
perspective, one REG offered, “Lack of a fully integrated, enterprise-wide approach to risk
management (structural/governance defects), inadequate resources devoted to risk management
functions (under skilled and under staffed), MIS insufficient to provide for risk data aggregation
across the firm (fragmented IS and reporting structure), mis-aligned employee incentive
compensation policies (emphasizing profits without appropriate consideration of associated
risks), and cultural/tone-from-the-top environmental factors that allowed and sometimes
encouraged excessive risk taking were several of the key barriers to effective risk management.”
Corporate greed - themed comments were the fourth most common, however, only REGs
comments reflected this theme. Interestingly, our coding and subsequent content analysis did not
identify this theme with RMs, yet, the instances from REGs alone were enough that this theme
ranked fourth overall. One REG offered, “I believe the barriers included complacency (e.g.,
prosperity, what bubble?), lack of accountability (e.g., "too big to fail" so called insurance
policy) and too much greed (e.g., revenue based incentives primarily driving all financial
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transaction decisions, including those decisions made by Rating agencies. Risk management was
not part of the compensation equation.)” Another stated, “Focus on profitability over safety and
soundness. Lack of concentration risk management practices. Short-term incentive compensation
practices need to put capital to use.”
Risk focus - based comments were the fifth most common overall among RMs and
REGs. They indicated that the long stability leading up to the crisis reduced risk focus for many
organizations. One REG stated, “I think the sustained period of stability was a factor. Also the
stress scenarios used by management across the LOBs and risk categories did not expose the
level of credit and liquidity risk within the institutions.” A RM shared a similar perspective
stating, “A long period of stability caused increased loosening until the system imploded.”
The remaining themes reflected complexity & interconnectedness (e.g., complexity and
interconnectedness of financial/economic environment creates barriers to effective risk
management), overconfidence (e.g., overconfidence in existing risk management processes),
regulatory oversight (e.g., weak regulatory oversight), misalignment to strategy (e.g.,
performance/Compensation not aligned with organization risk tolerance, objectives),
repercussions (e.g., lack of appropriate repercussion, e.g., civil, criminal penalties, global
requirements), standardized risk management (e.g., risk management practices that were too
standardized and lacked adaptability), independent oversight (e.g., lack of independent risk
assessments/oversight), and qualitative challenges (e.g., firms lacked the qualitative perspective
to properly and consistently execute risk management).
IV.9 Quantitative, Qualitative, or Mixture
Respondents were asked to share their perspectives on current risk management
systems/practices and whether they believe current RMS were more quantitatively, qualitatively
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driven, or if it were a mixture of both. Tables 19 and 20 summarizes the respondents’ responses
to the open-ended question: “Would you describe current risk management systems/practices as
more “quantitatively driven” (i.e., increasing availability of data and the rising sophistication of
risk modeling renders more and more risk types as manageable by numbers), or “qualitatively
driven” (i.e., risk modeling and managing risks by numbers is turned to with caution; risk
measurements are trend indicators which may complement or be overwritten by senior
managerial discretion, experience and judgment) and to provide any additional perspectives.”
Our count analysis indicates that both RMs and REGs believe that current RMS are more
quantitatively driven. Our coding and subsequent content analysis for respondents who offered
perspectives identified six major categories of perspectives: quantitative (e.g., risk management
is becoming more driven from models/numbers), mixture (e.g., risk management needs to
balance strengths of both), judgment (e.g., data does improve risk management, but judgment of
management should be a factor), process & tools (e.g., quantitative practices, however, the
related processes, e.g., complex governance, complex models, do not allow for effective risk
management), qualitative (e.g., qualitative as some risk are inherently difficult to quantify), and
risk type (e.g., mixture as some risk are more quantifiable than others).
Table 19 Are current Risk Management Systems/Practices (RMS) more “Quantitatively”
Driven or “Qualitatively” Driven – Counts (QT = Quantitative; QL = Qualitative; M =
Mixture; D = Depends on Firm)
Current Risk Management Systems more
QT, QL, M, or D
Respondent
Type

Number of
Respondents

QT

QL

M

D

Highest %
/ View *

RM

32

17

6

9

0

53% / QT

REG

76

33

9

28

6

43% / QT

Question: Would you describe current risk management systems/practices as more
“quantitatively driven” (i.e., increasing availability of data and the rising sophistication of risk
modeling renders more and more risk types as manageable by numbers), or “qualitatively driven”
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(i.e., risk modeling and managing risks by numbers is turned to with caution; risk measurements
are trend indicators which may complement or be overwritten by senior managerial discretion,
experience and judgment)? Please be as specific as possible.
* Reflects the percentage of the most frequent view. Both RMs and REGs viewed current RMS as
more Quantitatively driven.

Both RMs and REGs indicated that current RMS are seemingly more quantitatively
driven. RMs and REGs indicated quantitative at 53 percent and 43 percent respectively. Many
REGs however identified mixture (37 percent) and comments appear to be reflective of the
current regulatory environment that calls for modeling techniques in determining capital levels
that must be augmented by qualitative measures such as scenario analysis and strength of internal
controls. For the REGs who indicated it depends on the firm, comments were light with
responses such as “depends on the institution,” or “it depends on size and complexity of the
institution.”
Table 20 RMs and REGs who offered Perspectives with their choice of QT, QL, M, or D –
Categories

Category

Quantitative

Mixture

Judgment

Coded Response
Risk management is
becoming more driven
from models/numbers.
Modeling/tools should
not replace management
judgment.
Risk management needs
to balance strengths of
both.

Mixture as some risk are
more quantifiable than
others.

Modeling/tools should
not replace management
judgment.
Data does improve risk
management, but
judgment of
management should be a

Representative Response
Quantitatively driven. We must
be able to set quantifiable limits
and measure against them to
consider the risk management
program to be effective (RM)
It's a mix that I think the industry
is still trying to get right now.
There is a need to quantify risk,
but it cannot stand by numbers
alone. It needs to be balanced
with the knowledge and
experience of management and
independent risk managers.
Finding that balance is
something that I see banks
struggle to get right. (REG)
More qualitatively driven. Some
risks can be easily measured
given the availability of data, but
we tend to over engineer a risk
management process by
assigning variables, weighting
and then computing some risk
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Number of Responses /
Percentage of Total
RMs
REGs
Total

11 / 34%

24 / 32%

35 / 33%

9 / 28%

23 / 31%

32 / 30%

4 / 13%

11 / 15%

15 / 14%

factor.

Qualitative as
management should use
data with caution to
complement experience.
Quantitative practices,
however, the related
processes, e.g., complex
governance, complex
models, do not allow for
effective risk
management.
Process &
Tools
Risk management is
becoming more driven
from models/numbers.

Qualitative as some risk
are inherently difficult to
quantify.

Qualitative

Risk management is
becoming more
qualitatively driven.

Risk management needs
to balance strengths of
both.

Risk Type

Mixture as some risk are
more quantifiable than
others.

score so that we can neatly and
easily compartmentalize risks.
While it's a helpful exercise to
separate major risks from less
material ones, it also simplifies
the subjectivity and time bound
nature of assessing risks and
discounts management
discretion, experience and
judgment. (RM)
Current risk management is at a
crossroads. Historically, it may
have relied more heavily on
quantification for risk
management, but it has not
proven to be effective as a
"forward looking" mechanism.
The maturation of qualitative
based methodologies such as the
risk and control self assessments
and scenario analysis are
reaching the point to be on the
stage with quantitative
methodologies. However, the
banks need to strengthen their
data management practices to
ensure both quantitative and
qualitative tools function
effectively. (REG)
It's more qualitative. There
should be a balance between the
two. In some cases, there is a
lack of talent or expanding
emphasis on the quantitative
side. We risk having blind spots
by just solely going on senior
management discretion. It's
what you "don't see" or what
you're not 'willing to see' that
creates issues/events. (RM)
Qualitatively driven, with the
exception of credit risk
management which tends to be
quantitative. Due to the
maturity of certain risk
management practices (e.g.
credit, liquidity, and interest rate
risk) in most institutions, they
are more easily quantified, are
ingrained and garner significant
attention. Other risks, such as
compliance and reputation risk,
are extremely difficult to
quantify. Most measurements of
these nebulous risks tend to be
performance indicators and not
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5 / 16%

7 / 9%

12 / 11%

3 / 9%

7 / 9%

10 / 9%

0 / 0%

3 / 4%

3 / 3%

risk indicators, backwardslooking and not forwardlooking. This leads management
to be more reactive rather than
proactive. (REG)
Question: Would you describe current risk management systems/practices as more “quantitatively driven”
(i.e., increasing availability of data and the rising sophistication of risk modeling renders more and more
risk types as manageable by numbers), or “qualitatively driven” (i.e., risk modeling and managing risks by
numbers is turned to with caution; risk measurements are trend indicators which may complement or be
overwritten by senior managerial discretion, experience and judgment)? Please be as specific as possible.

Quantitative themed comments were the most common among both respondent groups.
They indicated that risk management is becoming more driven by models and numbers with
capabilities to set quantifiable limits and measure against them. According to one REG, “They
are more quantitatively driven, which is primarily due to 1) the large size and complexity of
large institutions, which requires more quantitatively driven approaches, and 2) regulators have
pushed banks that way, especially through exercises like CCAR. Regulators have all but ignored
or severely undervalued the qualitatively driven de-risking and risk management that has take
place post-crisis. For example, some banks have significantly de-risked via improved AQ,
changed underwriting practices and strategies, and running-off problem assets, but regulators
give them little credit and instead focus on the bank's CCAR models.” Another REG stated,
“Risk management is more quantitatively driven as institutions attempt to model for every
situation.” The RMs shared these perspectives as one stated, “Risk management practices are
more quantitative today than they were prior to the crisis. Additional work is required to ensure
that the models are more robust, the data used in decision making process are high quality. The
key to sustainability is process excellence.” Another RM shared, “Yes, current risk management
practices are more quantitatively driven in my space. It's all about scorecard management and
how we are tracking that.”
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Mixture - themed comments were the next most common. As noted, a higher number of
REGs responses aligned to this theme than RMs with the difference between REGs indication of
quantitative and mixture counts from our content analysis resulting in 24 and 23 respectively.
One REG stated, “The current risk management environment is a mixture of quantity and quality
driven methodologies with history established and models to project into the future a range of
performance scenarios and financial outputs.” Another REG offered similar perspectives which
also seemed to capture challenges organizations face today by stating, “Many firms are trying to
hold on to quantitatively driven systems given the time and effort placed into creating complex
models. However, the importance of qualitative factors is being realized and a shift is taking
place. I believe both are almost equally considered in today's companies.” An RM shared a
similar perspective stating, “I believe it is a combination of both. I think we've got better
numbers for the models, but that the past performance bias of the models may not be as good a
predictor of future performance due to the large number of changes that have been implemented.
I believe we need a more effective way to weight the changes in the business, for example
practices that have been stopped or businesses that have been sold as a moderator to the capital
models.”
Judgment - themed comments were the third most common. For both RMs and REGs
who initially appeared to indicate quantitative, qualitative or mixture, our content analysis
identified such an explicit indication of the importance of judgment regardless of said indication,
this category was thus created. As an example, one RM stated, “The shift is toward quantitative
but the current mix is still typically 60 / 40 qualitative / quantitative. Dependence on experience,
judgment and reflection will not diminish, but will be fortified with better quantification of risk
factors.” One REG shared a similar perspective indicating, “I believe, current risk management
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practices are being driven by both quantitative and qualitative factors. The regulatory and
legislative environment seems to be largely driving a change toward a more quantitative
approach. For example, Basel legislation seems to be pushing the banks toward developing
sophisticated risk rating programs and risk modeling systems, to calculate the bank's risk based
capital calculation. However, the bank's still seem to maintain a sense of expert judgment and
discretion, in their risk management programs and modeling assumptions. In my opinion, the
bankers seem to realize the importance of providing this judgmental overlay, to the quantitative
modeling approach.”
Process & tools - themed comments were the fourth most common. Our content analysis
for both RMs and REGs indicated some of the comments that appeared initially as quantitative
or mixture themes were in fact driving at deeper concerns with processes and tools that needed to
be reassessed, as without these, the data was meaningless.

According to one RM, “I would

describe my experience as more quantitatively driven at the present. We are in an environment
of over measuring and reporting. In fact the amount of data and reporting has become so dense
that in fact the metrics/reporting themselves can be a barrier to effective risk management.” A
similar sentiment was offered by a REG who stated, “They are more quantitatively driven which
in most cases can be a problem because the banker does not understand the data and what it is
really telling them. Garbage in - garbage out. ” This perspective appears to be in line with
Martin et al.’s (2007) study which suggest process tool challenges can be seen in circumstances
where risk management practices were not able to be supported by the risk applications and
infrastructure.
Qualitative - themed comments were fifth as both RMs and REGs indicated some risks
are inherently difficult to quantify. One RM state, “It's more qualitative. There should be a
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balance between the two. In some cases, there is a lack of talent or expanding emphasis on the
quantitative side. We risk having blind spots by just solely going on senior management
discretion. It's what you "don't see" or what you're not 'willing to see' that creates issues/events.”
A REG shared this view stating, “It is mostly qualitatively driven. Quantitative measures vary
significantly by risk discipline, product line, etc. However I still believe decisions to concentrate
on certain asset classes or activities is largely strategic outcomes based on organizational
perceptions of what they are good at. I have yet to visit a bank where statisticians are occupying
the executive suites.”
Risk type - themed comments were only identified with REGs. Similarly to judgment
and process & tools, our content analysis indicated the responses were driving at the impact that
the type of risk may have. As one REG shared, “Qualitatively driven, with the exception of
credit risk management which tends to be quantitative. Due to the maturity of certain risk
management practices (e.g. credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk) in most institutions, they are
more easily quantified, are ingrained and garner significant attention. Other risks, such as
compliance and reputation risk, are extremely difficult to quantify. Most measurements of these
nebulous risks tend to be performance indicators and not risk indicators, backwards-looking and
not forward-looking. This leads management to be more reactive rather than proactive.”
Another REGs comment indicated impacts of risk type by stating, “I think it is a mixture of both.
Some things such as credit risk are more easily quantifiable than other things such as strategic or
operational risk.” While this theme was only identified with REGs, it is consistent with
Lundqvist’s (2014) study’s suggested pillar of “specific risk identification and risk assessment
activities which is integral to implementing enterprise risk management systems/practices.”
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IV.10 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of RMS
In our final open-ended question, we asked respondents to share their suggestions to
improve the effectiveness of risk management systems/practices. Table 21 summarizes the
respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “What changes would you suggest to
improve the effectiveness of risk management systems/practices?”
Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified eight major categories of
suggestions: improve risk function (e.g., risk management that functions and emanates
consistently at Enterprise level down to current business activity level), risk culture (e.g., culture
of risk management and accountability supported by the board and senior leadership),
preemptive techniques (e.g., develop more dynamic, forward looking, and preemptive risk
management tools and techniques that blends quantitative and qualitative), aligned to strategy
(e.g., performance/compensation aligned with organization risk tolerance, objectives), regulatory
oversight (e.g., strengthen regulations and regulatory oversight), repercussions (e.g., implement
stronger repercussion for individual and organization, e.g., civil, criminal penalties, capital
penalties), industry standards (e.g., risk management standards tailored at an industry level), and
independent oversight (e.g., stronger independent assessment of risk management, e.g., outside
organization/3rd line of defense).
Table 21 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management Systems/Practices
– Categories
Category

Improve Risk
Function

Coded Response
Enhance the risk
monitoring and
challenge function
with the right people
involved in process.
Improve risk
management metrics
and reporting.

Representative Response
Human resources responsible
for risk management must be
treated like critical employees
instead of a necessary evil. They
should be qualified and
empowered to do their jobs
effectively. They should also see
themselves in senior
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Number of Responses / Percentage
of Total
RMs
REGs
Total

6 / 21%

21 / 27%

27 / 26%

Risk Culture

Risk management
that functions and
emanates consistently
at Enterprise level
down to current
business activity
level.
Experienced,
sufficiently
compensated risk
management
personnel.
Culture of risk
management and
accountability
supported by the
board and senior
leadership.
Performance/Compen
sation aligned with
organization risk
tolerance, objectives.

Preemptive
Techniques

Aligned to
Strategy

Regulatory
Oversight

Develop more
dynamic, forward
looking, and
preemptive risk
management tools
and techniques that
blends quantitative
and qualitative.
Stronger risk analysis
and use of lessons
learned.
Improve risk
management metrics
and reporting.
Performance/Compen
sation aligned with
organization risk
tolerance, objectives.
Culture of risk
management and
accountability
supported by the
board and senior
leadership.

Strengthen
regulations and
regulatory oversight.

management - both in terms of
promotion opportunities and in
terms of support from senior
management. (REG)

The mandate of senior
management, and examples of
senior management support of
the enterprise and in-businessunit risk groups would improve
the perception of the risk
management process across the
firm. The perception of a risk
(and audit) group much be
culturally changed to that of a
partner to the business, not an
adversary. (RM)

5 / 18%

16 / 21%

21 / 20%

Needs to be established to
handle short-term and long-term
issues/situations facing the
institution. Must be dynamic to
adjust to unforeseen events in
the market place and be able to
identify and measure existing
risks. (REG)

7 / 25%

12 / 15%

19 / 18%

Compensation tied to risk
management across all
disciplines / Rewards for
elevating high risk processes or
self identified audit issues /
Acknowledgement and training /
Communication (RM)

4 / 14%

14 / 19%

18 / 17%

Maintain current high level,
macro oversight by banks and
regulators. However, insure
that regulators have the capacity
(staff and experienced/trained
examiners sufficient to conduct
targeted reviews. Ensure
continuous monitoring is in

2 / 7%

6 / 8%

8 / 8%
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place at all large (>$10B).
(REG)

Repercussions

Implement stronger
repercussion for
individual and
organization, e.g.,
civil, criminal
penalties, capital
penalties.

Industry
Standards

Risk management
standards tailored at
an industry level.

Independent
Oversight

Stronger independent
assessment of risk
management, e.g.,
outside
organization/3rd line
of defense.

Financial accountability at the
most senior levels (i.e. CEOs
and board members), as well as
business line heads. (REG)
I would recommend more
consistency in how risk
management is managed in the
industry. Focus would be to
ensure all financial institutions
are managing to the same high
standards. (RM)
I think a periodic, independent
assessment of risk management
systems and practices is needed
in an organization on a regular
basis. This can be from the third
line od defense, but an outside
firm's view is the best. They see
risk management across an
industry and can provide
valuable help in identifying
emerging trends. (REG)

0 / 0%

5 / 6%

5 / 5%

3 / 11%

1 / 1%

4 / 3%

1 / 4%

2 / 3%

3 / 3%

Question: What changes would you suggest to improve the effectiveness of risk management
systems/practices? Please be as specific as possible.

Lessard et al. (2009) suggest that risk management should be embedded and integrated in
the company's cultural and organizational fabric such that it is barely noticeable as a distinct
management function at either the strategic or tactical level. Also, Lundqvist’s (2014) study
suggests “holistic organization of risk management” as a pillar that is integral to the
implementation of enterprise risk management systems/practices. In line with these
perspectives, the most common suggestion category overall was improve risk function. They
indicated that risk management functions that emanate at the enterprise level down to business
activities are key as are risk management monitoring and challenge functions with the right
skilled resources. According to one REG, “Human resources responsible for risk management
must be treated like critical employees instead of a necessary evil. They should be qualified and
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empowered to do their jobs effectively. They should also see themselves in senior management both in terms of promotion opportunities and in terms of support from senior management.” One
RM offered, “Staff operational and compliance risk management functions as needed to provide
the depth of coverage required to proactively monitor and assist in managing risk.”
Risk culture-themed comments was the second most common category overall. These
responses reflected earlier comments of the importance of a strong risk culture and compensation
practices. One RM suggested the following, “The mandate of senior management, and examples
of senior management support of the enterprise and in-business-unit risk groups would improve
the perception of the risk management process across the firm. The perception of a risk (and
audit) group much be culturally changed to that of a partner to the business, not an adversary.”
One REG shared a similar view stating, “It has to start at the top of the organization. The board
and senior management need to fully understand and support its enterprise risk management
framework. Risk management needs to be integrated in all levels of the organization. To
improve systems and practices, we need to ensure that we are providing appropriate education
and training to develop the proper talent needed to sustain sound progress towards developing
risk management into a business as usual function.”
While preemptive techniques was overall the third most common suggestion, this was the
top suggestion overall for RMs. Both RMs and REGs indicated however the need to develop
more dynamic, forward looking, risk management tools and techniques that blends quantitative
and qualitative methods. This is consistent with Mikes (2014) study which suggests design
parameter of risk tools which we adapted to the Execution phase. This theme of preemptive
techniques may provide practitioners context to consider relative to the Execution phase. One
RM stated, “Better tools that can be scaled to measure and quantify effectively. Balance of
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adherence vs risk taking. We tend to over-do one at the expense of the other depending on the
financial climate and performance of the company. Good leadership with vision and willingness
to have transparency.” This view was shared by one REG who stated, “Focus on preemptive risk
management processes. Too often risk management policies and practices are developed after an
incident has occurred and are prepared to correct prior existing issues, while attempting to stop
future occurrences.”
Although aligned to strategy was overall the fourth most common suggestion, this ranked
third overall for REGs. Both respondent categories indicated a need to improve alignment
between risk culture and risk accountability to strategy. One RM suggested, “Compensation
tied to risk management across all disciplines / Rewards for elevating high risk processes or self
identified audit issues / Acknowledgement and training / Communication.” A REG shared this
perspective indicating, “More stringent compensation, hiring and governance requirements. The
Chief Risk Officer should be as important to the Company as the CEO and as independent.
Compensation and should be a direct reflection of performance over the long term. A hindrance
to compensation management is the ability for talented individuals to job hop without regard for
their previous employer.”
The overall fifth most common suggestion was regulatory oversight, however, this
ranked sixth overall for RMs. Both suggested the strengthening of regulations and regulatory
oversight. As one REG stated, “Maintain current high level, macro oversight by banks and
regulators. However, insure that regulators have the capacity (staff and experienced/trained
examiners sufficient to conduct targeted reviews. Ensure continuous monitoring is in place at all
large (>$10B).” One RM offered this suggestion, “There needs to be appropriate pressure by
regulators on firms to improve effectiveness and keep focus on risk management. However,
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prescriptive approaches are less beneficial that conceptual frameworks left to the banks/insurers
to interpret and apply themselves as they see appropriate to the unique aspects of their
organizations. Regulators genuinely need to eliminate the "too big to fail" perception in the
market place by reinstating Glass Steagall and reducing the size of banks and increasing the
number of larger banks. Too much focus on the largest financial institutions at the expense of
smaller financial institutions.”
Repercussions was the overall sixth most common suggestion, however, this ranked last
overall for RMs and all responses to this category were from REGs. Perhaps this should not be
surprising given the nature of this category relative to bankers and regulators. One REG offered,
“Accountability for risk takers, if not from within (upper management / Board / shareholders),
then the financial institution regulatory agencies should step up their game by making full use of
remedies already at their disposal (suspensions and/or removals/permanent industry bars).”
Another REG suggested, “Let individual firms bear the consequences of the failed risk
management, e.g. eliminate "too big to fail",” while another stated, “Financial accountability at
the most senior levels (i.e. CEOs and board members), as well as business line heads.”
The overall seventh most common suggestion was industry standards. They suggested
the development of more industry centric risk management to drive consistency, more industry
collaboration, and more global coordination. One REG stated, “Risk mgmt and regulatory
supervision should be more coordinated across the global while still taking into consideration the
different cultures and beliefs.” This sentiment was reflected in one RMs comment stating, “A lot
of progress has been made on risk management, but reducing variability within and across
institutions will be required for risk management to be effective within the industry.”
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The final suggestion was independent oversight where they suggested stronger
independent assessment of risk management systems/practices. As offered by one REG, “I think
a periodic, independent assessment of risk management systems and practices is needed in an
organization on a regular basis. This can be from the third line of defense, but an outside firm's
view is the best. They see risk management across an industry and can provide valuable help in
identifying emerging trends.” This was echoed by one RM stating, “Independence needs to be
there; stronger then third line.”
IV.11 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of RMS: Analyzed Through Descriptive
Profiles
We sought to further analyze the suggestions to improve the effectiveness of RMS as
reflected in Table 21 by analyzing the suggested improvements by the respondent groups
descriptive profiles captured in Table 2 to determine if there were differences in the ranking of
the suggested improvements by analysis through gender, education, and age of our respondent
groups of RM and REG. Tables’ 22, 23, and 24 summarize the suggested improvements by
gender, education, and age respectively.
Table 22 summarizes the suggested improvements by gender of the respondent groups.
The gender total count differs from the education, age, and summary of suggested improvements
Tables of 28 RMs and 77 REGs. The gender total count is 27 RMs and 76 REGs as two
respondents did not provide their gender, however, we were still able to code these two
respondent’s responses through our content analysis and hence include the category of their
coded response as part of the gender total count. These two are reflected in the table as “blank.”
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Table 22 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management Systems/Practices
– Analyzed Through Descriptive Profiles – Gender
Respondent
Group

RM

REG

Gender **

Category *
AtS
RO

Count

IRF

RC

Pre

Rep

IS

IO

Male

21

2

3

7

3

2

0

3

1

Female

6

3

2

0

1

0

0

0

0

Blank

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Sub-total

28

6

5

7

4

2

0

3

1

Male

60

17

10

10

13

5

3

1

1

Female

16

3

6

2

1

1

2

0

1

Blank

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Sub-total

77

21

16

12

14

6

5

1

2

27

21

19

18

8

5

4

3

Overall Total Count ***

* The Category acronyms correspond to the Categories identified in Table 24 resulting from our content
analysis, subsequent coding, and category identification as follows: IRF = Improve Risk Function; RC = Risk
Culture; Pre = Preemptive Techniques; AtS = Aligned to Strategy; RO = Regulatory Oversight; Rep =
Repercussions; IS = Industry Standards; IO = Independent Oversight.
**Two respondents (1 RM and 1 REG) did not provide their gender, however, we were still able to code
these two respondent’s responses through our content analysis and hence include the category of their coded
response as part of the gender total count. These two are reflected in the table as “blank.”
***The overall total count reflects the summation of the sub-totals for RMs and REGs for each Category.
This conforms to the total count figures presented in Table 21.

While the overall total count conforms to the totals in suggested improvements to RMS
Table 21, which we expected, we do note several differences in rankings of suggestions for
improvement of RMS by gender. First, for RMs, the most frequent category was preemptive
techniques; yet, females had no responses that were coded as this. For females, the top category
was improve risk function which aligns to the top overall category when combining both
respondent groups. It is difficult to surmise what may be the root cause driver of the difference
in males versus females relative to preemptive techniques, however, relative to its top ranking to
the RM respondent group would seem to suggest this is due to their intimacy with risk
management in day to day activities as bankers and hence their desires for the development of
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more dynamic, forward looking, and preemptive risk management tools and techniques that
blends quantitative and qualitative methods.
Second, for REGs, the most frequent category was improve risk function and it was the
top category for males. However, for females, it was second, behind risk culture. Perhaps one
driver may be the females desire to be overall more protective. Yet, as with RMs and their
overall top choice of preemptive techniques, not surprisingly, the top choice for our supervisory
regulators of improve risk function may be driven in part by their sense of the importance of
oversight and governance capabilities in financial institutions.
Table 23 summarizes the suggested improvements by education of the respondent groups.
We collapsed education into two groups; four year college or less and more than four year
college. Unlike gender, all respondents provided their education profile thus there is no blank
label and consistent with the suggested improvements Table 21 and gender Table 22, the
respondent group counts are 28 and 77 for RMs and REGs respectively.
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Table 23 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management Systems/Practices
– Analyzed Through Descriptive Profiles – Education
Respondent
Group

RM

Education **
Four year
college or less
More than four
year college
Sub-total

REG

Four year
college or less
More than four
year college
Sub-total

Category *
Pre AtS RO

Count

IRF

RC

7

1

3

1

2

0

0

0

0

21

5

2

6

2

2

0

3

1

28

6

5

7

4

2

0

3

1

28

10

6

6

5

1

0

0

0

49

11

10

6

9

5

5

1

2

77

21

16

12

14

6

5

1

2

27

21

19

18

8

5

4

3

Overall Total Count ***

Rep

IS IO

* The Category acronyms correspond to the Categories identified in Table 24 resulting from our content
analysis, subsequent coding, and category identification as follows: IRF = Improve Risk Function; RC = Risk
Culture; Pre = Preemptive Techniques; AtS = Aligned to Strategy; RO = Regulatory Oversight; Rep =
Repercussions; IS = Industry Standards; IO = Independent Oversight.
** We collapsed education into two groups; four year college or less and more than four year college.
***The overall total count reflects the summation of the sub-totals for RMs and REGs for each Category.
This conforms to the total count figures presented in Table 21.

The sub-totals and the overall total count numbers do not change compared to the
suggested improvements Table 21, and gender Table 22. For RMs, the most frequent category of
preemptive techniques was generally suggested by those with more than a four year degree; this
may provide those individuals with additional insights and perspectives and may serve as the
difference between individuals with similar overall years of experience. This may also reflect
additional learned perspectives resulting in more explicit suggestions such as industry specific
risk management standards and independent oversight beyond the traditional third line of
defense, versus perhaps the more general notion of “culture,” which was the top category for
RMs with four year college or less. Similarly for REGs, the distinctions appear to be in
categories of repercussions, industry standards and independent oversight, which may reflect
additional learned perspectives resulting from additional formal education.
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Table 24 summarizes the suggested improvements by age of the respondent groups. We
collapsed age into three groups; less than mid (i.e., 34 or less), mid (i.e., 35 – 44), and more than
mid (i.e., 45 or more). Unlike gender, all respondents provided their age profile thus there is no
blank label and consistent with the suggested improvements Table 21, gender Table 22, and
education Table 23, the respondent group counts are 28 and 77 for RMs and REGs respectively.
Table 24 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management Systems/Practices
– Analyzed Through Descriptive Profiles – Age
Respondent
Group

RM

REG

Age **

Category *
AtS
RO

Count

IRF

RC

Pre

Rep

IS

IO

Less than Mid

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Mid

9

3

2

1

1

0

0

1

1

More than Mid

19

3

3

6

3

2

0

2

0

Sub-total

28

6

5

7

4

2

0

3

1

Less than Mid

4

1

2

0

1

0

0

0

0

Mid

15

2

3

3

4

2

1

0

0

More than Mid

58

18

11

9

9

4

4

1

2

Sub-total

77

21

16

12

14

6

5

1

2

27

21

19

18

8

5

4

3

Overall Total Count ***

* The Category acronyms correspond to the Categories identified in Table 24 resulting from our content
analysis, subsequent coding, and category identification as follows: IRF = Improve Risk Function; RC = Risk
Culture; Pre = Preemptive Techniques; AtS = Aligned to Strategy; RO = Regulatory Oversight; Rep =
Repercussions; IS = Industry Standards; IO = Independent Oversight.
** We collapsed age into three groups; less than mid (i.e., 34 or less), mid (i.e., 35 – 44), and more than mid
(i.e., 45 or more).
***The overall total count reflects the summation of the sub-totals for RMs and REGs for each Category. This
conforms to the total count figures presented in Table 21.

The sub-totals and the overall total count numbers do not change compared to the
suggested improvements Table 21, gender Table 22, and education Table 23. For RMs, the most
frequent category of preemptive techniques was generally suggested by those in the more than
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mid group; this may be indicative of the experiences of these individuals with existing risk
management techniques utilized within their institutions thus prompting this response. For
REGs, the most frequent category if improve risk function may be a reflection of these seasoned
supervisory regulators to improve risk function to enhance oversight and governance capabilities
in financial institutions.
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V

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE
RESEARCH

V.1 Conclusions
Despite the past history of financial crisis’ including the most recent Great Recession and
the resultant calls to improve risk management, there is still good reason to worry about the role
and profile of risk management as financial institutions continue to be distressed by negative
events. Yet, current assessment still finds that empirical work on ERM is limited (Eckles et al.,
2014) and in most cases, our review of risk management literature has found that the focus of the
articles was not explicitly to seek barriers to effective risk management.
This research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Our exploration of
barriers to effective risk management connects with previous work of Kleffner et al. (2003), and
Beasley et al. (2005) that calls for additional research including barriers to effective risk
management. The proposed RGF utilizes an RMS with three phases of Readiness, Execution,
and Administration adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011) connects with his call for leveraging these
factors and phases of RMS in different empirical ways relative to risk management. We refined
our RMS by drawing from Mikes et al.’s (2014) study which suggests three ERM design
parameters and three contingency variables classifying different types of risk events and
Lundqvist’s (2014) research which suggests four pillars as integral to the implementation of an
ERM. This connects with their calls for leveraging these design parameters and contingency
variables, and furthering analysis of the four pillars. Schiller et al. (2014) suggests that
organizations risk management is limited due to a lack of the concept of risk and risk knowledge
generation with current ERM frameworks. Hence, our final contribution is our proposed RGF
that draws from van Asselt et al.’s (2011) three risk principles which connects with her efforts to
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synthesize risk governance and incorporate these principles to serve as the underlying guiding
risk principles of our proposed RGF.
As a result, our research on barriers to effective risk management through the lens of the
proposed RGF, which incorporates the RMS enhanced as noted, provides rich perspectives on
barriers to effective risk management and suggestions to improve effectiveness of risk
management which may help practitioners and academia alike consider ways to analyze and
improve risk management.
In comparing RMs and REGs, the findings indicate that our respondents strongly viewed
that barriers to effective risk management can manifest in the phases of Readiness, Execution
and Administration. The respondents also strongly viewed the importance of the three risk
principles to effective risk governance and risk management. Both RMs and REGs have similar
views of the selected barriers to effective risk management ranking accountability, i.e., a lack of
accountability, poorly defined job roles/responsibilities, and the level of employee involvement
in risk management systems/practices, as the top item with only the Independent Samples T-Test
for oversight indicating a statistically significant difference. Some studies suggest that the focus
on auditability by interested stakeholders may cause organizations to overlook perhaps weaker
indicators that may actually point towards risks (Power, 2004; Huber et al., 2013; Tekathen et al.,
2013). Our results however do not seem to support that auditability focus is a strong barrier to
effective risk management. Of the selected nine possible barriers to effective risk management,
auditability ranked ninth overall and for REGs, and tied for eighth overall for RMs.
Both RMs and REGs believe compensation practices may manifest barriers to effective
risk management and indicated the greatest barrier may arise from compensation practices that
are misaligned to strategy. They indicated personnel “should be compensated for behaving
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consistently with the strategy, i.e., performing what is expected and not inspected.” This
misalignment could also be with an organizations risk tolerance levels as one REG noted the
importance of “aligning to risk management strategies.” In addition, excessive risk taking and
lack of compensation related controls round out the top three. While both respondent groups
indicated that barriers may manifest in the Execution phase, the percentage of REGs who viewed
this was higher than RMs and both indicated Administration as the second most impacted phase
which appears reasonable with the notion of properly administering compensation practices to
ensure alignment to strategy.
The notion of “insurance” creating barriers to effective risk management reflected some
differences between RMs and REGs where RMs generally did not believe barriers would
manifest and REGs generally indicated it may. However, it is interesting that REGs “Yes”
response was 49 percent and “No” response was 47 percent which seems to indicate questions
exists on the notion of “insurance” and the “moral hazard” it may present. For some RMs and
REGs, regulatory oversight themed comments indicated a perceive benefit to risk management
resulting from the “higher price is paid through high capital requirements” thus causing
organizations to “become more active in challenging business decisions.” However, there was
agreement on the phase where barriers may manifest; for those respondents who indicated
phases, the highest percent for both RMs and REGS was for the Execution phase.
On how complete RMS must be to be “effective,” both respondent groups overall
indicated “<100 percent complete.” The top category of themes for both “100 percent complete”
and “<100 percent complete” was dynamic risk management. The general notion for both
appeared to be that regardless of the percent complete, “the bar on RMS should be dynamic and
evolve with the environment.” There were clear indications of the importance of risk culture
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with RMS but its meaning differed, e.g., the “<100 percent complete” responses indicated the
risk culture as important to enable RMS when less than 100 percent, yet, for “100 percent
complete” was cited with, “Leaving a framework incomplete sends the message that risk
management is not a priority.” The second top category for “100 percent complete” and “<100
percent complete” was key risk controls and risk management maturity level respectively. For
“100 percent complete” key controls included yearly simulations and trail testing of key controls
and for “<100 percent complete” respondents indicated strong risk managers can offset
incomplete RMS.
The state of the financial/economic environment is viewed as important in shaping
general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk management and that these perceptions may
generate barriers to effective risk management. Both RMs and REGs viewed the level of
importance as overall high. If barriers were to manifest they would generally do so in the
Execution phase. Administration was the next most cited phase where barriers may manifest.
Risk focus was the top category as respondents indicated that periods of stability may reduce the
focus on or priority of risk management. Concerns were also expressed that strong risk culture
needs to be maintained in both up and down cycles. Similarly, both respondent groups indicated
that perceived stability may drive more risk taking and complacency. Interestingly both
respondent groups indicated regulatory oversight may manifest barriers by “driving the focus of
risk management” or that there is a “lag between financial entrepreneurialism and regulation.”
In an effort to identify barriers to effective risk management leading up to the financial
crisis of 2007-2009, our analysis revealed 13 major categories. The top three are risk culture,
underestimating risk, and siloed risk management. Organization culture was identified in a study
of Malaysian public companies of independent non-executive directors as impacting, or being
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barriers to, their effectiveness in performing their roles (Annuar, 2012). In line with this, risk
culture was the top theme overall among RMs and REGs. They indicated that risk culture and
accountability were missing in most organizations as one RM stated: “Lack of need for effective
risk management - it is not embedded cultural in most organisations, and certainly not within
organisations that have a strong focus on Investment banking, so are more prone to risk taking.
Historically, I have not found effective risk management practices and culture to be embedded
appropriately within these types of banks and financial services, so it is not surprising that
ineffective practices were in place prior to the regulators mandates for RRP requirements.”
Underestimating risk responses from both respondent groups indicate insufficient stress testing
and consideration of tail events, a lack of imagination, and lack of understand of the types of
risks present. Both respondents indicated siloed risk management as the third category citing a
lack of integration from an enterprise level down to a LOB unit level. They indicated this
included inadequate resources devoted to risk management functions.
Mikes’ (2011) study characterized two types of calculative risk cultures of “quantitative
enthusiasm” and “quantitative scepticism” and our results seem generally consistent in that our
content analysis of respondents’ responses identified a mixture category indicating both
quantitative and qualitative even though mixture was not offered in the survey question.
However, our results do not appear to align with the notion of “scepticism” with quantitative
information but rather a need to balance the “strengths” of quantitative and qualitative methods.
Nonetheless, both RMs and REGs indicated that current RMS are seemingly more quantitatively
driven. REGs however also identified with mixture along with quantitative at 37 percent and 43
percent respectively. Quantitative based themes indicated large size and complexity of
institutions require more quantitative driven approaches which have been amplified by
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regulations such as capital adequacy reviews. The mixture based themes do not necessarily cast
quantitative method in a negative light but rather impress the growing importance of qualitative
methods such as scenario analysis and risk control self assessments and that simply some risk are
just inherently difficult to quantify.
The final perspectives obtained from the respondent group were suggestions to improve
the effectiveness of RMS. REGs suggested as their top choice, which was the top choice overall,
to improve the risk function. This includes enhancing the function with experienced, sufficiently
compensated personnel; improving monitoring and challenge functionality by ensuring the right
people are involved in the process; and improving risk metrics and reporting. While improve risk
function was the top category overall, for RMs, it was second and the top category was
preemptive techniques. RMs suggests the development of more dynamic, forward looking and
preemptive risk management tools and techniques that blend quantitative and qualitative
methods; stronger risk analysis and use of lessons learned; and also improving metrics and
reporting. Risk culture was overall second and both respondent groups indicated the importance
of a strong risk culture emanating down from the board and senior leadership with heavy
emphasis on accountability; and ensuring performance/compensation practices are aligned to
organization risk tolerances, objectives and strategy.
Our study adds perspectives from those institutions risk management practices recently
required to create RPs and certain agency’s regulators, thus providing rich insights, and practical
perspectives to risk management professionals and academia alike. In most cases, our review of
risk management literature has found that the focus of the articles was not explicitly to seek
barriers to effective risk management. Our study provides such focus and additional
perspectives. Also, we do not necessarily portray our proposed RGF as an enterprise-wide risk
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management system or as a framework for just financial institutions, but more so a model that
may be drawn upon by practitioners in varying industries and at all levels of an organization’s
risk management practices.
V.2 Implications
Our research indicates that empirical work on risk management is limited and can be
classified along three main lines of research – describing the ERM practice, analyzing the
determinants of ERM adoption, and assessing the valuation effect of ERM (Eckles et al., 2014).
While these paradigms may offer continuing research opportunities, we suggest a different
mission for risk management in research and practice. Our agenda would move us away from
perhaps why RMS is or is not adopted to one of why does it not function as fully as intended.
Given the emphasis on RMS and the seemingly continued focus on it and the challenges
it has faced, the extant research often seems peripheral to the core importance of RMS: to
mitigate risks. RMS adoption, including its most popular form of ERM, and whether its
organically developed or whether you are getting the necessary valuation from RMS, does not
seem as controversial any more versus the time where most financial institutions were throwing
around the acronym of “ERM” as the savior against risk. It seems since, and perhaps evidenced
by literature and more importantly, real life negative events, that RMS, including ERM, has
continued to miss the mark of its intended purpose: to mitigate risk. Our mission seeks to pursue
research of RMS in empirical ways that go beyond the traditional paradigms to new, more
realistic and practical views.
At the core of our mission are four perspectives. We share these perspectives to help
move away from these current paradigms that seems to, in part, drive RMS research and to help
practitioners leverage this study’s findings in their fight against barriers to effective risk
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management. First, the notion of controls and procedures are important points to include as part
of any RMS, but its focus should not be at the expense of the RMS’s intended purpose of
mitigating risks. This may drive the perception that RMS is simply a part of a “tools culture”
driven by concerns for audit and control thus undermining its ability to improve risk
management (Huber et al., 2013a). Hence, we can see the evolved accounting or internal
controls based RMS serving as organizational compliance mechanisms or “rationalization
machines” which have been implicated as the reason for some company’s failure, as risk
management was relegated to a compliance function (Ghoshal, 1987; Beasley et al., 2010; Mikes
et al., 2014; Burchell et al., 1980; Kaplan et al., 2012).
One way to achieve a more sound foundation of RMS to transcend these perceptions and
truly drive a “risk focus” versus “controls focus” is to ground RMS in Risk principles. The
concept of risk management and governance pertains to the various ways in which many actors,
individuals, and institutions, public and private, deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty,
complexity, and/or ambiguity (van Asselt et al., 2011). Risk principles may serve as guidance
for practitioners as they need to understand how different individuals and groups within
organizations define risk, potential biases in risk assessment, and challenges in implementing
risk management initiatives as many risks cannot be calculated on the basis of probability and
effects alone (Bromiley et al., 2014; van Asselt et al., 2011).
Second in our mission is normative research on barriers to effective risk management.
Our review of risk management literature generally did not find articles focusing explicitly on
barriers to effective RMS. Our study provides practical perspectives that may be explored to
provide realistic benefit and value in understanding risk management both practically and
academically. From our selected barriers to effective risk management question, lack of
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accountability and weaknesses in risk management personnel resonated most with both our
respondent groups (see Table 7). Risk culture was prevalent through our respondents’ responses
and was the top category identified of barriers leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (see
Table 18). The top three suggestions to improve the effectiveness of RMS are improving the risk
function, risk culture, and preemptive techniques (see Table 21).
Normative implications may be beneficial and such studies could investigate, for
example, are there particular risk categories (e.g., operational, credit risk) that preemptive
techniques may be better suited for, or what prevents organizations from incorporating more
forwarding looking risk management tools and techniques. Similarly, we can seek perspective of
our study’s identified “mixture” category when we sought respondent’s perspectives on whether
the current RMS’s are more quantitatively or qualitatively driven. Rather than seeking
perspectives of “calculative risk cultures” (Mikes, 2011) and whether organizations are
“quantitative enthusiast or skeptics,” perhaps perform studies on organizations to identify “RMS
enthusiast” and the type of “risk culture” that is present that shapes their success or failure.
Studies of factors impeding “accountability” as cited by both our respondent groups as the top
barrier of effective RMS from the selected barriers question would seem warranted and perhaps
timely with recent negative events including the London Whale and from past issues such as
underwriting issues stemming in part from the notion of “robo signing.” Research on
inconsistent “risk focus” could ask how organizations may improve it such that it is consistently
maintained in both up and down financial cycles; is it due to management biases or some other
theoretical concept that may be root cause drivers of, for example, complacency during up
cycles. This may in turn provide organizations practical perspectives to consider correcting such
impediments to consistent execution of “risk focus.”
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Continued leveraging of the RGF is the third mission perspective. Schiller et al., (2014)
suggests that organizations risk management is limited due to a lack of the concept of risk and
risk knowledge generation with current ERM frameworks. Further, some suggest that the
current ERM model is too strongly influenced by accounting and auditing standards of control,
with an emphasis on detailed controls supported with robust documentation evidencing
effectiveness of the controls (Power, 2009; Talwar, 2011; Jordan et al., 2013). Our RGF seems
warranted as it foundationally rest on Risk principles versus emphasizing standards of internal
controls which may enhance the understanding of risks and the ways in which actors and
institutions, public and private, deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or
ambiguity (van Asselt et al., 2011) that appear to be lacking with current organizational risk
management (Schiller et al., 2014).
On-going investigation of RMS at financial institutions through the RGF may continue to
refine and further enrich the practical insights gained from our study. Table 17 lists the
previously discussed category of barriers by phase as determined by our content analysis for the
questions pertaining to compensation practices, the banking environment providing a type of
“insurance,” and the state of financial/economic environment. Further research into these
barriers may enhance views and perspectives into current RMS to identify more practical
solutions by phase to mitigate these barriers. Similarly, scrutiny from academia may identify
factors correlating to organization learning, adaptive leadership, or decision making theories that
provide additional insights into these theories and/or other paradigms.
Finally, we would probably all agree that RMS will continue to be a focus area for
practitioners for the foreseeable future. With that said we believe our study identifies practical
focus areas for practitioners to consider breaking down barriers to effective risk management and
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improving RMS. We suggest that while the study’s major findings and implications are not
necessarily definitive answers to the challenges of RMS, we are confident in suggesting that the
perspectives obtained from these RMs and REGs should be strongly considered and leveraged
where appropriate regardless of industry.
V.2.1 Major Suggestions/Implications
The major suggestions and implications to improving RMS are reflected in Table 25.
This table reflects the top overall categories from the questions: nine selected barriers to effective
risk management, compensation practices, barriers leading up to the financial crisis of 20072009, suggestions to improve risk management, and state of the financial/economic environment.
Table 25 Major Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management
Systems/Practices
Category *

Accountability




Misalignment
to Strategy






Risk Culture



Suggestions/Implications
Organizations should be more
aggressive enforcing accountability.
More explicit processes, procedures
and governing policies.
Should apply to all areas of the
organization.
Should include control and assurance
functions, i.e., Risk Management
Function and Internal Audit.
Risk Management Function should
perform periodic assessment of risk
culture at Enterprise and business unit
level.
Internal Audit should perform periodic
assessment of the Risk Management
Function relative to risk culture and at
the business unit level relative to risk
culture.
These assessments should be
fundamentally and deliberately
enhanced to first align with van Asselt
et al.’s (2011) Risk principles focus of
understanding how the enterprise
and/or business units tackle risks that
they may not be certain with, are
complex or ambiguous, before jumping
straight to the notion of, “what are the
controls and processes we have in
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Study Question
Nine selected barriers to effective
risk management (Table 7).

Compensation practices (Table 9).

Barriers leading up to the financial
crisis of 2007-2009 (Table 18).

place?”



Improve Risk
Function









Risk Focus



Implement more dynamic, forward
looking, and preemptive risk
management tools and techniques that
blend quantitative and qualitative
methods.
Risk Management Function and
personnel should be of high stature in
the organization and very
knowledgeable of business area.
Risk Management Function needs to be
respected (e.g., due to high knowledge
of the business area) and perhaps, on
certain levels, feared.
Require continuous monitoring of
Enterprise and business area risk focus
by first, second, and third lines of
defense.
These assessments should be
fundamentally and deliberately
enhanced to first align with van Asselt
et al.’s (2011) Risk principles focus of
understanding how the enterprise
and/or business units tackle risks that
they may not be certain with, are
complex or ambiguous, before jumping
straight to the notion of, “what are the
controls and processes we have in
place?”
Board/senior management and risk
culture must explicitly stress the
importance of RMS in both up and
down cycles; this should be supported
by many of the aforementioned
suggestions/implications.

Suggestions to improve
effectiveness of RMS (Table 21).

State of the financial/economic
environment (Table 16).

* Top overall categories from the questions of nine selected barriers to effective risk management,
compensation practices, barriers leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, suggestions to improve
risk management, and state of the financial/economic environment.

Accountability – was the top category from the nine selected barriers to effective risk
management question (Table 7). Organizations, simply put, need to be more aggressive on this
point. As one REG indicated, “You can have all the systems and/or processes in the world…but
it matters not when the body creating risk is not held accountable.” It must be hardwired at the
board and senior management team level and the notion of a “lack of accountability” should be
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eliminated. Incorporating the use of explicit procedures, controls and governing policies and
standards can drive the importance of and enforcement of accountability and it should be done so
at all levels and areas of an organization.
Misalignment to strategy – was the top category from the compensation practices
question (Table 9). However, this perspective is critical on many levels as our respondents’
responses suggest, thus it should not be limited to the notion of compensation alone. Many
financial institutions have a strategy and may have elements such as a risk appetite statement to
serve as guidance for the entire organization. Ensuring that all organizations actions and
activities are not in contravention of these types of guiding statements needs to be critically
assessed. While areas such as compensation practices in revenue generating areas may be an
obvious area of focus to ensuring alignment to strategy and should not be ignored, critical
assessment should include ensuring proper alignment of the Risk Management Function program
and the scope and activities of the Internal Audit function to such guiding statements, thus
ensuring the rigor and direction of these control/assurance functions.
Risk culture – was the top category for the barriers leading up to the financial crisis of
2007-2009 question (Table 18), but was also a prevalent category in other questions. A strong
risk culture, including risk management, cannot be viewed, as noted by one RM, “as an
impediment by the business or an expensive overhead cost.” Much the same with
Accountability, and really any of these categories, it must start from the top of the organization
and be driven throughout the organization to all levels. As the notion of risk “culture” denotes a
conceptual/intangible perspective, one way to put some substance to risk culture may be to
formalize explicit assessments of risk culture by second and third lines of defense in the form of
the Risk Management Function creating “risk culture” requirements that businesses must adhere
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to and are periodically assessed against by the Risk Management Function. This could be further
supported by periodic assessments by Internal Audit’s review of the Risk Management Function,
i.e., how well they drive adherence to risk culture at the business unit, and enterprise levels.
These assessments should be fundamentally and deliberately enhanced to first align with van
Asselt et al.’s (2011) Risk principles focus of understanding how the enterprise and/or business
units tackle risks that they may not be certain with, are complex, or ambiguous. The Risk
Management Function should have a critical eye toward business units or enterprise functions
that tend to jump straight to the notion of, “what are the controls and processes we have in
place,” i.e., a “controls focus” versus ensuring their understanding of the risk presented, i.e., a
desired “risk focus.”
Improve risk function – was the top category for the suggestions to improve the
effectiveness of RMS question (Table 21). Several of the respondents indicated the need to have
risk management processes and techniques emanating from the enterprise level consistently
down to the business unit level. Also, one REG suggested that the Risk Management Function,
“Should be qualified and empowered to do their jobs effectively. They should also see
themselves in senior management - both in terms of promotion opportunities and in terms of
support from senior management.” While we did not disagree with the importance of the stature
of the Risk Management Function, we suggest, and view the following as equally if not more
important than stature, that the Risk Management Function needs to be respected for its
knowledgeable personnel; perhaps on a certain level, even feared, due to their practical
knowledge of the businesses they support in a second line capacity.
Risk focus – was the top category for the question of the state of the financial/economic
environment (Table 16). Organizations need to focus on putting a priority on RMS in both up
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and down cycles. This is important as one RM indicated, “All the attention is placed on bad
times because there is proof of poor risk taking. In good times, when too much risk is being
taken, there is no proof and therefore less ability to challenge that behavior. It’s about sustaining
reasonable behavior during both parts of the cycle.” One suggestion is to deploy similar tactics
noted for risk culture whereby periodic mandatory risk assessments are performed relative to
maintaining risk focus by the first, second, and third lines of defense. As one REG indicated,
“The systems were not in fact good when the economy was favorable but the shape of the
economy played a big part in everyone believing that risk management was good because there
was a lack of testing of the adequacy of systems.” However, as noted for risk culture, these
assessments should be fundamentally and deliberately enhanced to first align with van Asselt et
al.’s (2011) Risk principles focus of understanding how the enterprise and/or business units
tackle risks that they may not be certain with, are complex, or ambiguous. The Risk
Management Function should have a critical eye toward business units or enterprise functions
that tend to jump straight to the notion of, “what are the controls and processes we have in
place,” i.e., a “controls focus” versus ensuring their understanding of the risk presented, i.e., a
desired “risk focus.”
This study provides many more practical consideration points for practitioners to
consider towards breaking down barriers to effective risk management. History of the financial
crisis’ experienced over the years paints a dire picture of the supposed positives of RMS;
however, we view our study as one that provides rich perspectives of barriers to effective risk
management that is not readily apparent in extant literature, that we believe will have positive
implications for both academia and practitioners alike.
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V.3 Limitations
Risk management as a technical discipline has been in existence for over 50 years and it
seems the role and its profile will continue to have strong bearing in practice and in academia.
Though this study has proposed a RGF, it is an exploratory initial effort. As with all research,
there are limitations associated with this study. This study builds from Cho et al.’s (2014) study
on perceptions of the effectiveness of RPs. Hence, first, the study targeted only the 130 financial
institutions subject to the Section 165 (d) RP formation requirements and only two groups, Risk
Managers and Regulators. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that expanding the
targeted population and the respondent groups to non-financial industries and non regulated
groups may build upon this study’s data and further enrich perspectives on barriers to effective
risk management. Second, this analysis required coding of responses, and identification of
categories and themes, and required professional judgment, still however, the intercoder
reliability seems to evidence sound analysis. Lastly, the RGF has been developed from existing
literature and the researcher’s perspectives as a regulator.
V.4 Future Research
Future research leveraging this RGF may identify opportunities for enhancement based
on feedback from industry practitioners and academia. A study focusing more explicitly on
facets of the RGF may identify opportunities for enhancement and provide additional insights
into the practical applications, for example, of the three risk principles. A second area of
research is continued exploration of the insights obtained from this study. Risk culture was such
a prevalent theme and perhaps it should not be a surprise, but one obvious question is what are
barriers to effective risk culture? The notion of adaptive leadership and the possible benefits
toward driving an organization to embrace risk culture may provide insights to risk management
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challenges as well. Third, research into the impacts of modeling and their use to an
organizations risk management processes may be insightful with the growing regulatory
requirements calling for the use of models; does this change the dynamics of the risk functions?
The necessary make-up of resources in the risk function? One respondent indicated that he/she
has yet to go into a bank and see a “quant” sitting in the CEO’s desk, but what about CRO? Or
COO? Fourth, continuing exploration using the RGF in other regulated industries such as
healthcare may provide further rich context on barriers to effective risk management.
V.5 DISCLAIMER
This study does not represent the views of any particular financial institution, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or the 12 Federal Reserve District Banks.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Tables
Table 26. Critical Success Factors and Definitions, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), and Mikes et al.
(2014)*.
Variable name
Definition and properties
Business type
Type of the business that the organization is involved in, including its final product
or service, and the relative level of technology that is implemented in the
organization.
Communication
Communication of risk issues, communication systems which are used in the
organization, and its hardware infrastructure and software capabilities design. It
also includes data analysis systems and non-official and emotional communications
within the organization.
Consultants
Documentation

Education

Environment

General management
skills
Leadership

Organizational culture
Organizational structure
Performance reporting
Process design

Project management
skills
Resources

Accountability
Reward and recognition
system

Utilization of management consultancy services in organization.
Documentation system which is used in the organization and its hardware
infrastructure and software capabilities design. It also includes the data accuracy
level in the organization.
Competence, awareness, training, and education of the organization’s personnel,
including risk management staff about RMS, its processes, tools, and applications.
External environment in which the organization is performing. It encompasses the
effects of market, suppliers, competitors, socio-political systems and also the
organization’s partnership and joint venture strategies.
(2) External risks.
General management skills including problem-solving, negotiating,
communication, and influencing the organization.
Leadership characteristics of risk and top managers. This factor is excluded from
general management skills due to its importance and attention that it has gained
from risk management researchers and practitioners.
Staff morale and commitment. Flexibility, adaption to change, and respect to
external management consultants.
Organization’s design, allocation of authorities, and responsibilities.
Risk performance measurement, monitoring, and feedback for both short- and longterm performance measurements.
Detailed and clear process design for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks;
frequency of risk meetings; and risk tools design and availability of documented
process ownerships for the organization’s internal processes.
(1) Processes for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks; Frequency of risk
meetings; Risk tools.
(2) Preventable risks; Strategy execution risks; External risks.
Maturity of the organization’s project management capabilities.
Availability of all kinds of resources and infrastructure including human resources,
organizational validity, and technical validity. Cost and time are also included in
this category.
Job roles/responsibilities and also level of employee involvement in RMS clearly
defined.
Availability of reward and recognition system schemes in organizations.
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Strategy

Team-building
Top management

Well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and long-term strategy toward
risk management in the organization.
(2) Strategy execution risks.
Existence of developed teams and teamwork spirit within the organization.
Level of top management support of RMS practices.
* Denotes Design parameters (1), and Contingency variables (2).

Table 27. Critical Success Factors (CSF) - Readiness, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), and Mikes et al.
(2014)*.
Readiness CSF*
Defined as: Factors that have influence on the inclination and readiness of a
corporation for implementing RMS.
Environment
External environment in which the organization is performing. It encompasses the
effects of market, suppliers, competitors, socio-political systems and also the
organization’s partnership and joint venture strategies.
Organizational culture

Staff morale and commitment. Flexibility, adaption to change, and respect to external
management consultants.

Resources

Availability of all kinds of resources and infrastructure including human resources,
organizational validity, and technical validity. Cost and time are also included in this
category.

Strategy

Well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and long-term strategy toward
risk management in the organization.
(2) Strategy execution risks.

*For this study we mainly selected those CSFs that were graded as more significant. We also selected "Strategy"
for all three phases as it was graded more significant in all three.
Denotes Design parameters (1), and Contingency variables (2).
Table 28. Critical Success Factors (CSF) - Execution, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), and Mikes et al.
(2014)*.
Execution CSF*
Defined as: Factors that are important during the design and
implementation of RMS in a corporation and can significantly affect the success
of RMS design and implementation.
Performance reporting

Risk performance measurement, monitoring, and feedback for both short- and longterm performance measurements.
Process design
Detailed and clear process design for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks;
frequency of risk meetings; and risk tools design and availability of documented
process ownerships for the organization’s internal processes.
(1) Processes for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks; Frequency of risk
meetings; Risk tools.
(2) Preventable risks; Strategy execution risks; External risks.
Accountability
Job roles/responsibilities and also level of employee involvement in RMS clearly
defined.
Strategy
Well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and long-term strategy toward
risk management in the organization.
(2) Strategy execution risks.
*For this study we mainly selected those CSFs that were graded as more significant. We also selected "Strategy"
for all three phases as it was graded more significant in all three.
Denotes Design parameters (1), and Contingency variables (2).

127

Table 29. Critical Success Factors (CSF) - Administration, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), and Mikes
et al. (2014)*.
Administration CSF* Defined as: Factors that are crucially important to successfully run, maintain,
update, and administrate RMS after design and implementation.
Communication

Organizational
structure
Strategy

Communication of risk issues, communication systems which are used in the
organization, and its hardware infrastructure and software capabilities design. It also
includes data analysis systems and nonofficial and emotional communications within
the organization.
Organization’s design, allocation of authorities, and responsibilities.

Well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and long-term strategy toward
risk management in the organization.
(2) Strategy execution risks.
Top management
Level of top management support of RMS practices.
*For this study we mainly selected those CSFs that were graded as more significant. We also selected "Strategy"
for all three phases as it was graded more significant in all three.
Denotes Design parameters (1), and Contingency variables (2).
Table 30. RMS design parameters and contingent variables, adapted from Mikes et al. (2014).
Processes for identifying,
assessing, and
prioritizing risks

Design Parameters
- Risk identification can take place face-to-face or through self-assessments.
- Risk discussions can be confined to senior line managers and staff or can be
decentralized by engaging front-line, support, and administrative staff as well.

Frequency of risk
meetings

Frequency of risk identification and assessment processes must match the velocity of
risk evolution.

Risk tools

- Use multidimensional visualizations, such as risk maps, to quantify risks along
likelihood, impact, and controllability dimensions.
- Choice of risk tools, ranging from qualitative descriptions and scenarios to the
measurement of expected and unexpected loss, will be conditioned by (1) the
availability of data and knowledge about a particular risk (loss) and (2) how relevant
and reliable the available risk tools are in the eyes of risk experts and everyone else
using the tools.

Preventable risks

Contingency variables, classifying risk types
Arise from routine operational breakdowns or from employees’ unauthorized, illegal,
unethical, incorrect, or inappropriate actions. Companies gain nothing by tolerating
such risks; they are inherently undesirable. Depending on the firm’s tolerance for
failure and on the existence of cost-effective controls, management should strive to
reduce the incidence of preventable risks to zero.

Strategy execution risks

Organizations may take on risks to generate superior returns; while mitigation efforts
may occur, some residual strategy risks will always remain.

External risks

Arise from events that the company cannot influence. Some of these risks are closely
entwined with the firm’s strategic choices and are therefore related to strategy
execution risk. For example, mergers and acquisitions and geographical and market
expansion entail the partly controllable risks of strategy execution, but they also
introduce external uncontrollable uncertainties—new political, regulatory, and
competitive environments.
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Table 31. Four Pillars of RMS Implementation, adapted from Lundqvist (2014).
General internal environment
The first two components are not directly associated with risk management;
and objective setting
These can be viewed as ‘‘prerequisites’’ of ERM implementation. These
components are necessary to have well-functioning and well implemented ERM
General control activities and
but are neither connected directly to risk management activities nor specific to
information and
ERM. Therefore, firms with no effort toward holistic risk management, or risk
communication
management at all for that matter, can have implemented these two prerequisite
factors robustly.
Holistic organization of risk
The third component distinguishes between firms that are actively managing
management
different risks of the firm and those that are not, but this component provides no
information on the organization of these risk management activities.
Specific risk identification and
risk assessment activities

The fourth component contains the dimensions that are characteristic of an
enterprise-wide risk management implementation, for example, formal written
statement of risk appetite, correlating and determining portfolio effects of
combined risks, having a senior manager assigned the responsibility of
overseeing risk.

Table 32 Guiding Risk Principles of the Proposed Risk Governance Framework, adapted from van Asselt
et al. (2011).
Principle*
Defining details
Communication and
- CI is used in the two-way sense of the term. Effective mutual CI is one of the key
Inclusion (CI)
challenges in risk governance.
- Positively framed, CI is at the core of any successful risk management activity.
Negatively framed, a lack of CI destructs risk management.
- CI in the context of RMS refers to exchanges between policy-makers, experts,
stakeholders and the general public, and among themselves.
- Aim of CI is to provide a better basis, also in terms of trust and social support, for
responsible governing of uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks.
- CI may serve the sharing of information about the risks and possible ways of
handling them.
- CI may support building and sustaining trust among various actors through which
particular arrangements or risk management measures become acceptable.
- CI may result in actually involving people in risk-related decisions, through which
they gain ownership.
- CI does not mean that everyone is communicating with everyone during the whole
process. Social learning is required also to figure out which type of CI with whom is
important in which phase or stage of the RMS.
- Critical issues for CI include: Who is included? What is included? What are the
scope and mandate of the process?
- CI can take different forms: roundtables, open forums, negotiated rule making
exercises, mediation, or mixed advisory committees, including scientists and
stakeholder.
- CI is needed to explore various sources of information and to identify various
perspectives.
- CI is a means to agree on principles and rules that should be respected in the
processes and structures of collective decision-making.
- CI supports the co-production of risk knowledge, the coordination of risk
evaluation, and the design of risk management.
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Integration

- Refers to the need to collect and synthesize all relevant knowledge and experience
from various disciplines and various sources including uncertainty information and
articulations of risk perceptions and values.
- Emphasizes that also values and issues such as reversibility, persistence, ubiquity,
tolerability, equity, catastrophic potential, controllability, and voluntariness should be
integrated in risk assessment and evaluation.
- Reflects the importance of such multi-dimensional evaluations. Risk management is
not usually about a single risk; it requires risk(s)-benefit(s) evaluations and risk-risk
trade-offs.
- Refers to the process itself. Risk management advances a holistic
approach to framing, appraising, characterizing, evaluating, and managing risks. This
implies that a strict separation between risk assessment and risk management is
counterproductive.
- Calls attention to the need to consider the interconnections, both content-wise and in
terms of process, between the various risk-related activities.
- Risk governance cannot be routinized. It is important that the actors and institutions
involved reflect on what they are doing to manage risk and continue to emphasize
that the risks considered are uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous, as the temptation
to treat them as simple and to apply familiar routines remains huge.
- A collective reflection about balancing pros and cons is needed.
- Emphasizes that there are important difficult issues (uncertainty, complexity,
ambiguity, and balancing act) that need repeated consideration of all actors
throughout the process. Otherwise, the process risks to (re)introduce the familiar
frames and routines developed for simple risks.

*These three principles should not be considered as separate steps or stages, but as principles that should be
considered at every step or phase in the risk management system.
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Table 33. Proposed Risk Governance Framework, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), Lundqvist
(2014), Mikes et al. (2014), and van Asselt et al. (2011).
Risk Management System
Readiness

Execution

Administration

General internal environment
and objective setting
General control activities and information and communication
Holistic organization of risk management
Specific risk identification and risk assessment activities

Guiding Risk Principles
Communication and Inclusion
Integration
Reflection
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Appendix B: Survey questionnaire
SAMPLING PLAN
We will sample from a Federal Reserve email distribution list which will produce a list of regulators and bankers,
and LinkedIn members. We will also leverage/apply snow ball effect technique generated from the above sources.
We also plan to reissue the link to the web-based questionnaire 3 additional times (total of 4 distributions) to provide
ample opportunities for the respondents to participate.
For the lists obtained from the Federal Reserve email distribution, this will include personnel with the title of
“Examiner” and “Analyst” from all twelve Federal Reserve District Banks, which are as follows:
 Richmond
 New York
 Boston
 Atlanta
 Kansas City
 St Louis
 Minneapolis
 San Francisco
 Dallas
 Chicago
 Philadelphia
 Cleveland
The list obtained from the Federal Reserve email distribution will also include those Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) regulators, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulators, and Federal
Reserve System (Board) personnel with responsibility for the supervision and regulation of the 130 financial
institutions. The list obtained from LinkedIn will be comprised of only individuals from the 130 institutions with
job responsibilities generally associated with risk management responsibilities. Each respondent will be also be
invited to forward the invitation to their known colleagues who are bankers or regulators with responsibilities related
to risk management oversight. A systematic random sample will be selected from the developed e-mail lists. We
believe the sample population and sample size will be approximately 600. We anticipate we will have responses in
the range of 100 to 200 respondents. The respondents will be offered a summary of the study results as an incentive
for completing the survey.
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EMAIL INVITATION
Hello:
You are invited to complete our survey about how professionals like yourself feel about general risk management
practices and its impact on organizations and NOT just what has happened in the last 5-10 years, e.g., factors leading
to the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act.
The questions pertain to your PERSONAL views and beliefs and do NOT ask any questions about your employer.
The survey has 20 questions and should take you approximately 30 minutes to complete. Your participation in this
study is completely voluntary. Your responses and all data from this survey will be reported only in the aggregate
and no personal information will be shared. All information will be coded and will be, and remain
CONFIDENTIAL. If you have questions at any time about the survey or its procedures, you may contact Edward
Cho at the email address specified below.
If you are interested in a summary of the study’s results we would be happy to send them to you as a token of our
appreciation. At the end of the survey you’ll have an opportunity to identify this interest.
Thank you very much for your time and candidness. Please start with the survey now by clicking on the "Take the
Survey" text below.
Sincerely,
Ed Cho
Doctoral Candidate, Georgia State University.
echo14@student.gsu.edu
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SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Q1.

Q2.

Q2.1

Q2.2

Q2.3

Q2.4

For which type of organization are you currently employed?
1. Financial institution including bank or insurance company (GO TO Q2)
2. Government regulatory agency (GO TO Q2)
3. Other (TERMINATE)
Please review the statements below related to “Readiness” factors relative to risk management
systems/practices and select the answer that best reflects your personal views. “Readiness” factors are
defined as factors that have influence on the inclination and readiness of an organization for implementing
risk management systems/practices.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Poorly defined strategy hinders firms’
risk management systems/practices.
(Strategy is defined as the organizations
vision, mission, and long-term
objectives.)
Poor organization culture hinders firms’
risk management systems/practices.
(Organization culture is defined to
include staff morale and commitment,
and flexibility to change.)
Lack of appropriate resources hinder
firms’ risk management
systems/practices.
(Resources is defined to include
infrastructure including human
resources, and technical resources (cost
and time are included in this category).)
External environment in which the
organization is operating hinder firms’
risk management systems/practices.
(Environment is defined to include the
effects of market, suppliers, competitors,
socio-political systems, and the
organization’s partnership and joint
venture strategies.)

Q3.

Please review the statements below related to “Execution” factors relative to risk management
systems/practices and select the answer that best reflects your personal views. “Execution” factors are
defined as factors that are important during the design and implementation of risk management
systems/practices in an organization and can significantly affect the success of risk management
systems/practices.
Strongly
Disagree

Q3.1

Poorly understood strategy hinder
firms’ risk management
systems/practices.
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Strongly
Agree

(Strategy is defined as the organizations
vision, mission, and long-term
objectives.)
Q3.2

Q3.3

Q3.4

Poor process design hinder firms’ risk
management systems/practices.
(Process design is defined to include
processes for identifying, assessing, and
prioritizing risks; frequency of risk
meetings; and risk tools design; and
availability of documented process
ownerships for the organization’s
internal processes.)
Lack of accountability hinder firms’ risk
management systems/practices.
(Accountability is defined to include
defined job roles/responsibilities, and the
level of employee involvement in risk
management systems/practices.)
Inadequate risk performance reporting
hinder firms’ risk management
systems/practices.
(Performance reporting is defined to
include risk measurement, monitoring,
and feedback reporting.)

Q4.

Please review the statements below related to “Administration” factors relative to risk management
systems/practices and select the answer that best reflects your personal views. “Administration” factors are
defined as factors that are important to successfully run, maintain, update, and administrate risk
management systems/practices after design and implementation.
Strongly
Disagree

Q4.1

Q4.2

Q4.3

Poorly communicated strategy hinders
firms’ risk management
systems/practices.
(Strategy is defined as the organizations
vision, mission, and long-term
objectives.)
Inadequate organization structure hinders
firms’ risk management systems/practices.
(Organization structure includes the
design, allocation of authorities, and
responsibilities.)
Inadequate levels of top management
support of risk management
systems/practices hinder firms’ risk
management systems/practices.
(Support is defined to include driving
accountability and ownership of risk
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Strongly
Agree

management systems/practices.)

Q4.4

Inadequate communication of risk issues
hinder firms’ risk management
systems/practices.
(Communication is defined to include
processes to identify, assess and
prioritize risks, including software/data
analysis tools used to facilitate the
communication.)

Q5.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about Risk Governance and
Risk Management.
Strongly
Disagree

Q5.1

Q5.2

Q5.3

Q5.4

Communication is key to effective risk
governance and risk management.
(I.e., communication exchanges
between policy makers, stakeholders,
and experts.)
Inclusion is key to effective risk
governance and risk management.
(E.g. involving people in risk-related
decisions through which they gain
ownership.)
Integration is key to effective risk
governance and risk management.
(I.e., synthesis of risk perceptions and
values; risk management is not usually
about a single risk, it requires risksbenefits evaluations and risk-risk tradeoffs.)
Reflection is key to effective risk
governance and risk management.
(I.e., risk governance cannot be
routinized. Actors must reflect on what
they are doing to manage risk and
continue to emphasize that the risks are
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, as
the temptation to treat them as simple
and to apply familiar routines remains
huge.)

Q6.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement about risk management
systems/practices.
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Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
Q6.1

In general, if you want to manage risk,
you have to quantify it.

Q6.2

In general, current risk management
systems/practices support the
integration of learned or acquired risk
knowledge.
Organization compensation practices
that are misaligned with risk
management impact risk taking.
The current unique banking
environment promotes more risk taking
by institutions due to the concept of
“too big to fail.” I.e., taking risks is
made easier with the understanding that
the institution will be “bailed out.”
Risk management systems/practices are
important to overall institution
performance.

Q6.3

Q6.4

Q6.5

Q7.

Q7.1

Q7.2

Q7.3

Q7.4
Q7.5

Q7.6
Q7.7

Q7.8
Q7.9

Strongly
Agree

For each of the following statements, please indicate the degree to which you feel each is a barrier to
effective risk management. The scale is 1 to 7 where 1 means "Very Low Significance as a Barrier" and 7
means "Very High Significance as a Barrier."
Very Low
Very High
Significance
Significance
as a Barrier
as a Barrier
2
3
4
5
6
1
7
Risk management systems/practices are
more focused on auditability and
documentation evidence.
Lack of a well-defined and clearly
understood vision, mission, and longterm strategy toward risk management
in the organization.
Lack of accountability, poorly defined
job roles/responsibilities, and the level
of employee involvement in risk
management systems/practices.
Lack of qualified personnel to execute
risk management practices.
Disparity of local risk management
processes and enterprise level risk
management processes.
Lack of lower levels of management
involvement in risk assessments.
Inadequate level of documentation, i.e.,
lack of clearly documented risk issues
or concerns.
Inadequate oversight by the board and
senior leadership.
Organization challenges in
accommodating socio-political
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factors/pressures.

Q8.

Do you believe that an organization’s compensation practices may manifest barriers to effective risk
management? If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and
“Administration,” does it manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of these phase versus
another? Please be as specific as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Q9.

Do you believe that the current unique banking environment provides a type of “insurance” for some
organizations with the concept that “too big to fail” may indicate the organization would be “bailed out?”
If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,” does
this notion of “insurance” manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of these phases
versus another? Please be as specific as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Q10.

Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration” factors, for
risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please select the answer that best reflects
your personal views:
1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be complete and in place for risk
management systems/practices to be “effective.”
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to be
100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.”

Q11.

Please provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question above.
Please be as specific as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Q12.

How important is the state of the financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the
effectiveness of risk management? (i.e., if we are coming out of a financial crisis then general perceptions
of risk management may be different than if there is a long period of stability.). Please be as specific as
possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Q13.

Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,” do you
believe that the state of the financial/economic environment may manifest barriers to effective risk
management? (E.g., in periods of long stability, management may begin to focus less on Execution factors
thus creating potential barriers to effective risk management.) Please be as specific as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Q14.

Benefits cited by bankers and regulators that were preparing Resolution Plans included improved
understanding of the bank and improved risk management. However, risk management practices were in
place prior to the requirement for Resolution Plans. What do you believe were barriers to effective risk
management at firms leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009? Please be as specific as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Q15.

Would you describe current risk management systems/practices as more “quantitatively driven” (i.e.,
increasing availability of data and the rising sophistication of risk modeling renders more and more risk
types as manageable by numbers), or “qualitatively driven” (i.e., risk modeling and managing risks by
numbers is turned to with caution; risk measurements are trend indicators which may complement or be
overwritten by senior managerial discretion, experience and judgment)? Please be as specific as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Q16.

What changes would you suggest to improve the effectiveness of risk management systems/practices?
Please be as specific as possible.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Q17.

Please indicate your age:
1. Less than 25 years old
2. 25-34
3. 35-44
4. 45-54
5. 55 or older

Q18.

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?
1. Less than high school (Grades 1-8 or no formal schooling)
2. High school incomplete (Grades 9-11 or Grade 12 with NO diploma)
3. High school graduate (Grade 12 with diploma or GED certificate)
4. Some college, no degree (includes community college)
5. Two year associate degree from a college or university
6. Four year college or university degree/Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BS, BA, AB)
7. Some postgraduate or professional schooling, no postgraduate degree
8. Postgraduate or professional degree, including master’s, doctorate, medical or law degree (e.g., MA,
MS, PhD, MD, JD)

Q19.

What is your gender?
1. Male
2. Female

Q20.

If you’d like to receive a summary of this study’s findings, please enter your email address.
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_____________________

This concludes our survey. We thank you for your time and opinions.
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